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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The experience of physical symptoms is common to all 
of us. In fact, it would be difficult to find someone who 
did not feel some sort of bodily discomfort at least a few 
times during the year. For example, a poll of Psychology 
Today readers showed that respondents experienced symptoms 
such as nasal congestion, sore throat, muscle aches, upset 
stomach, and lower back pain sometime during the previous 
year (Rubenstein, 1982). Similarly, a survey of college 
students by Comstock and Slome (1973) showed that 70% 
of respondents reported that they experience a headache, a 
cold, or a sore throat at least once during the academic 
year. The National Center for Health Statistics (1981) 
has also reported that of the estimated 1.2 billion office 
visits to physicians during 1977 and 1978, approximately 
18.3 million were for the primary complaint of headache. 
From childhood we are taught that physicians are 
experts at making sense of symptoms, yet we must often 
diagnose and treat ourselves. It is common, for example, 
to attribute a headache to stress or a stomachache to 
indigestion. And though these assessments might be 
1 
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periodically correct, the average individual is not making 
a diagnosis with scientific or professional medical 
reasoning. Instead, he or she is relying upon a subjec-
tive understanding of symptom causality. 
If the use of aspirin is thought of as an indirect 
measure of the extent to which people self-diagnosis, it 
would appear that there are many individuals who diagnose 
their own symptoms. For example, a national health survey 
reported that 23% of adults use aspirin at least once a 
week, and an additional 52% use it occasionally (NCHS, 
1979). That translates into a lot of aspirin taken in an 
attempt to resolve the symptoms of a lot of different 
problems. 
Even when people decide to seek medical advice, they 
still might prefer their own diagnostic analysis. For 
example, it has been reported that 30% to 75% of patients 
do not adequately comply with treatment that has been 
prescribed by a physician (Haynes, Taylor, & Sackett, 
1979; Sackett & Haynes, 1976). It is not unreasonable to 
assume that some of these patients are not compliant 
because they do not believe the doctor's assessment of the 
problem. In the Psychology Today poll, it was found that 
nearly a third of respondents said that they have ignored 
their doctor's orders on at least one occasion in order to 
3 
treat themselves the way they thought best. In fact, one 
40 year old woman expressed her distrust of physicians 
when she said, "Avoid doctors except when you can't 
breathe, can't stop the bleeding, can't stand the pain, or 
need broken bones set" (p.36). 
Self-diagnosing can be a risky business, and the 
consequences can be felt on both the individual and 
institutional level. On the one hand, people who 
mistakenly feel that every ache and pain is indicative of 
a serious condition will place unnecessary strain upon 
medical and financial resources. On the other hand, 
people who underestimate the importance of some symptoms 
can jeopardize their life. As an example, consider the 
following passage from Hackett and Cassem (1975) that 
describes an individual who interpreted his symptoms 
incorrectly, and treated himself for a problem that should 
have had prompt medical attention. 
A 47 year old man was visiting a city for a 
business meeting. After a heavy meal he retired to a 
hotel room and began to experience severe pericardia! 
pain. Immediately, he took two aspirin followed by 
sodium bicarbonate. The pain did not abate; he began 
to pace the room and did some sitting-up exercises in 
an attempt to "bring up the gas." When this was 
unsuccessful he took a sleeping pill .•.• Upon his 
lying down, the pain spread to his left arm and caused 
him to think he was having an attack of bursitis, a 
condition he had had in the past. Even though his 
bursitic pains always had been confined to the 
shoulder and left arm -- totally unlike the chest pain 
he was experiencing -- he was able to take comfort 
4 
from his diagnosis and went into a light sleep. About 
an hour later he was awakened by an increase in the 
severity of his chest pain. By this time he felt "as 
though a truck had run over my chest." Until then the 
thought that he was having a heart attack had not 
crossed his mind (p.26). 
Although this passage is anecdotal, it is 
representative of many individuals who misdiagnose cardiac 
symptoms and delay seeking medical help until it is some-
times too late (Greene, Moss & Goldstein, 1974; Gutmann, 
Pollock, Schmidt & Dudek, 1981; Hackett & Cassem, 1969, 
1975; Mathews, Seigel, Kuller, Thompson & Varat, 1983; 
Olin & Hackett, 1964). Clearly, it would be advantageous 
to understand how the average person, that is the naive 
diagnostician, makes causal attributions for symptoms so 
that events such as these could be minimized in the 
future. 
Currently, there are two symptom attribution models 
in the literature, both of which have been derived from 
laboratory studies. These are the hypothesis verification 
(Skelton & Pennebaker, 1982) and illness prototype (Bishop 
& Converse, 1986) models. These will be discussed in 
detail later. However, it is important to note that 
because these models have been studied under controlled 
conditions they account for symptom attributions that 
occur in response to particular stimuli. They are not 
equipped to describe how attributions are made under more 
5 
generalized conditions. 
To understand the naive diagnostician, research 
needs to focus upon how people deal with symptoms when 
they are left to their own devices. In this way, inves-
tigators will be able to identify the internal resources 
(e.g., perceptions, attitudes, knowledge, experience) and 
external resources (e.g., cues, discussions with friends) 
that are involved in making symptom attributions. Re-
search at this level has not been done, but it is badly 
needed if we are to develop our knowledge of symptom 
attribution processes. 
It is a basic fact that there is a paucity of 
research in this area. Hence, if current models are to be 
studied within realistic contexts and if new models are to 
be created, then the scientific community needs to know 
more about how the average individual makes symptom 
attributions in his or her own environment. Such infor-
mation will provide a rich source of data that will be 
useful for both laboratory and field research. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Throughout the past forty years there has been 
scientific interest in exploring the ways in which the 
average individual conceptualizes health and illness. 
Although psychologists have shown recent interest in this 
area, much of the research has come from the disciplines 
of anthropology and sociology. In general, it has been 
shown that factors such as health beliefs, responses to 
illness, and health related actions are influenced by 
one's cultural and social mileu (e.g., see Fox, 1977; 
Illich, 1974, 1976; Mechanic, 1972; Parsons, 1951, 1972; 
Paul, 1963; Rosenstock & Kirscht, 1979; Snow, 1974; 
Zborowski, 1960). 
In more recent years, research has focused upon the 
perception of illness causality (Abrams & Finesinger, 
1953; DuCette & Keane, 1984; Lowery, Jacobson, & McCauley, 
1987; Lowery, Jacobson, & Murphy, 1983; Rudy, 1980; Taylor 
& Levin, 1976; Taylor, Lichtman, & wood, 1984). In addi-
tion, a number of authors have been interested in the 
illness causality perceptions of children, especially in 
terms of the changes that occur during cognitive develop-
ment (Bibace & Walsh, 1979; Brodie, 1974; Campbell, 1975a; 
6 
7 
Helman, 1978; Koslowsky, Croog & Lavoie, 1978; Mechanic, 
1964; Perrin & Gerrity, 1981). This line of research has 
explored the ways in which individuals understand how 
various forms of illness are acquired. Some studies with 
children have examined responses to questions such as 
"What are measles?," "How does someone get cancer?," "What 
happens when someone has a heart attack?," and so on. As 
expected, answers become more complex and conceptual as 
children progress through Piagetian stages of development. 
By the time one reaches the stage of formal operations, 
illness can be thought of as being caused by factors that 
are psychological as well as physical, and originating in 
the past as well as the present. Abrams and Finesinger 
(1953), for example, found that many adult cancer patients 
attributed their condition to some prior event such as a 
misdeed, an episode with venereal disease, physical trauma 
or self-neglect. Likewise, Taylor and Levin (1976) have 
noted that many women blame their breast cancer on some 
guilt provoking experience such as premarital sexual 
activity. 
Collectively, these studies attempt to understand 
the process of what can be called illness attribution; 
that is, the way in which individuals ascribe causes for 
the acquisition of physical infirmity. They do not, 
8 
however, explore mechanisms for symptom attribution; that 
is, the way in which people ascribe causes for their 
symptomatic experiences. The former tries to describe how 
the average person answers questions such as "How did I 
get cancer?" -- while the latter focuses on questions such 
as "Why do I have this lump in my breast?". 
To date, research on symptom attribution processes 
is relatively meager. In fact, only a few publications 
can be found that address this issue directly (Affleck, 
Pfeiffer, Tennen, & Fifield, 1987; Bishop & Converse, 
1986; Cameron & Leventhal, 1988; Campbell, 1975b; Ditto, 
Jemmott, & Darley, 1988; Dobbins, 1988; Dobbins & 
Wallston, 1987; Harwood, 1971; Jones, Wiese, Moore, & 
Haley, 1981; Kosko & Flaskerud, 1987; Lau & Hartman, 1983; 
Leventhal, Nerenz & Straus, 1982; Locker, 1981; Penne-
baker, 1980, Skelton & Pennebaker, 1982; Smith & Kane, 
1970). 
In the existing literature there are two symptom 
attribution models. In the hypothesis verification model, 
Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) posit that ill feelings are 
similar to other types of sensations in that they are 
diffuse and undifferentiated levels of arousal (cf. 
Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962). When someone 
experiences an unpleasant or ill sensation, Skelton and 
9 
Pennebaker (1982) argue that the individual forms a 
hypothesis about its cause. Following this, there is a 
search for supporting evidence. For example, someone who 
feels "queasy" might adopt the hypothesis that he or she 
has caught the flu. Given this, there would be a search 
for flu-related clues such as a runny nose, an upset 
stomach, fever, and so on. A confirmation of these signs 
would be support for the hypothesis. 
Although this model has not been tested directly, 
Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) provide support for its 
validity by citing findings from sensation and symptom 
perception research. In one study, Burnam and Pennebaker 
(1977) asked subjects to rate the extent to which they 
were experiencing 12 common physical symptoms after having 
either run in place or walked in place for two minutes. 
Subjects were asked to rate a combination of symptoms that 
could typically be associated with flu (e.g., upset stom-
ach, headache, nasal congestion) and physical exertion 
(e.g., racing heart, shortness of breath). In addition, 
the experimenter casually mentioned to half of the 
subjects -- "As you know, this is the time of the year 
when we are surrounded by cold and flu producing viruses, 
and many people aren't feeling well" (Skelton & Penne-
baker, 1982, p. 109). The results showed that that the 
10 
exercise symptoms were rated significantly higher than the 
flu symptoms for the individuals who ran in place. Rat-
ings, however, did not differ for those who walked in 
place. Moreover, when subjects' systolic blood pressure 
was partialled out, it was found that ratings for the flu 
symptoms exceeded the ratings of the exercise symptoms for 
those subjects who were exposed to the flu suggestion. 
Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) argue that the suggestion 
aided subjects' selective monitoring of flu-related 
symptoms, especially when they were experiencing a diffuse 
arousal {created by walking in place for a short while). 
In another study, Anderson and Pennebaker (1980) 
demonstrated that pleasure and pain can function as 
alternative interpretations of the same sensory experi-
ence, depending upon expectations. In this study, 
subjects signed a bogus consent form that described the 
sensations that they might experience during the experi-
ment. In the pain interpretation group, the consent form 
noted that subjects would come into contact with a stimu-
lus which has been found to produce a degree of pain. In 
the pleasure interpretation group, the word "pain" was 
replaced with "pleasure." And in the no interpretation 
group, no reference to the experience of pain or pleasure 
was made. After signing the consent form, subjects placed 
11 
their middle finger on a small, vibrating emery board for 
one second. 
Subjects rated their experience on a 13-point scale 
where negative scores indicated degrees of pain, and 
positive scores indicated degrees of pleasure. zero was 
the neutral point, indicating neither pain nor pleasure. 
In result, it was found that mean ratings were -1.00, 
+1.01, and +0.13 for the pain, pleasure, and no interpre-
tation groups, respectively. Differences among these 
ratings were statistically significant and consistent with 
expectation manipulations. Interviews with subjects 
revealed that no one thought that their experience could 
have been perceived differently from the way it was 
perceived. In other words, subjects in the pain interpre-
tation group believed that the stimulus could not have 
been perceived as being pleasurable, and the subjects in 
the pleasure interpretation group thought that the 
stimulus could not have been interpreted as being painful. 
It would appear, then, that expectations affected the way 
in which a sensation was perceived. As such, perceptions 
confirmed expectations. Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) 
believe that people search for symptoms in a similar way 
to confirm hypotheses about the causes of ill feelings. 
In a fundamentally different approach, Bishop and 
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converse (1966) have examined how individuals make symptom 
attributions in terms of illness prototypes. Their work 
is similar to that of Cantor and Mischel (1977, 1979a, 
1979b) who have applied the prototype concept to the area 
of person perception. 
In their experiment, Bishop and Converse (1986) gave 
subjects 12 short scenarios that described hypothetical 
individuals who were discussing their symptomatic experi-
ences with a friend. Although each scenario contained six 
symptoms, the experimenters varied the number of symptoms 
that were prototypical of a particular target illness. 
Prototypical symptoms were derived from pretest research. 
In high prototype scenarios, all six symptoms were 
prototypical of the target illness. In medium prototype 
scenarios, four symptoms were prototypical and two were 
not. In low prototype scenarios, two symptoms were proto-
typical and four were not. In addition, three scenarios 
were constructed in which no two symptoms were related to 
any particular illness or disease. These were called 
random scenarios. 
Subjects were asked to read each scenario and then 
rate (on a 7-point scale) the extent to which the symptoms 
therein were indicative of a particular illness. If sub-
jects thought that the scenario indicated an illness, they 
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were to identify it. Subjects were also asked to rate how 
confident they were about their illness identification. 
Overall, the results showed that subjects' illness 
ratings varied reliably as a function of the number of 
prototypical symptoms in the scenarios. The mean ratings 
were 5.17, 4.25, 3.84, and 3.53 for the high, medium, low, 
and random prototype scenarios, respectively. In addi-
tion, it was found that subjects made disease identifica-
tions for an average of 68% of the high prototype scenar-
ios while averaging 45%, 32%, and 34% of the medium, low, 
and random prototype scenarios, respectively. Moreover, 
the extent to which subjects' illness identifications 
matched the implied target illness was also related to the 
number of prototypical symptoms. Subjects made "correct" 
or related identifications 64% of the time for high 
prototype scenarios, while doing so 30% and 16% of the 
time for medium and low prototype scenarios, respectively. 
It was also found that confidence about illness 
identification varied as a function of the number of 
prototypical symptoms. Mean ratings were 5.21, 3.84, 
3.26, and 3.55 for the high, medium, low, and random 
prototype scenarios, respectively. This would indicate 
that subjects felt less confident about their illness 
identifications as the number of prototypical symptoms 
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diminished. 
conclusion 
Although the hypothesis verification and illness 
prototype models provide insight for understanding symptom 
attributions, they have limitations. For example, it 
would appear that the former is inadequate for explaining 
symptom attributions in the absence of emotional sensa-
tion. According to Skelton and Pennebaker (1982), it is 
an ill feeling that triggers the attribution process. As 
such, they do not provide a way for predicting how someone 
would try to determine the cause of sensationless symptoms 
such as hair loss, vision changes, painless lumps, and 
skin discolorations. Similarly, the work by Bishop and 
Converse (1986) does not describe how symptom attributions 
are made when prototype processing is not possible. This 
would probably occur in instances where someone experi-
ences a single or unfamiliar symptom. 
It is important that research be focused upon symp-
tom attributions as they occur in one's natural environ-
ment. It is this type of research that will uncover the 
behaviors and cognitive mechanisms that are most commonly 
employed by the average individual when ascribing causes 
to symptoms. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
The research by Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) and 
Bishop and Converse (1986) has begun to explore ways in 
which symptom attributions are made. The former have 
stressed the importance of ill feelings, hypothesis 
formation, and symptom searching, while the latter have 
focused upon illness prototype information processing. It 
should be kept in mind, however, that interest in this 
topic is very recent. There is only one article on 
illness prototypes, and the hypothesis verification model 
has not even been tested directly. 
Because the knowledge in his area is so limited, 
there is ample opportunity for considering the utility of 
other social psychological constructs. Therefore, this 
section will summarize research which suggests that causal 
schemas (cf. Kelley, 1972), the availability heuristic 
(cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974), and environmental 
cues (cf. Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) might 
be involved in symptom attribution processes. Moreover, 
this section will also present constructs such as expec-
tancy/ outcome incongruity (cf. Pyszczynski & Gre•nberg, 
1981), persuasion (cf. Storms & Nisbett, 1970), and 
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attribution perseverance (cf. Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, 
1975) in terms of their ability to promote or inhibit 
symptom reattributions. 
symptom Causal Schemas 
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Beliefs regarding the connection between symptoms 
and their causes is not new. It is known, for example, 
that the Assyrians of 1000 B.C. recited an incantation 
against a worm that they believed to cause toothaches 
(Sagan, 1980). Similarly, the medical term "influenza" 
has its origin in early Italian culture which linked 
illness to the stars -- astral influences (Sagan, 1980). 
In modern day society it would be rare to find someone who 
believes that aches and pains are the outcome of gingival 
worms or celestial entities. However, it is easy to see 
that families, teachers, books, friends, and the media 
imbue us with contemporary beliefs regarding the causes of 
symptoms. Mothers, for example, tell their children that 
they will get a sore throat or the sniffles if they get 
their feet wet. Popular magazines describe the ways in 
which stress makes one feel. High school health educators 
inform students of the outcomes of poor hygiene practices. 
In all, we are surrounded by a society that values knowing 
the relation between symptoms and their causes. 
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Although the term "causal schema" has not directly 
been used in the symptom literature, the recognition of 
the concept is evident. The work by Leventhal and 
associates (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980; Leventhal & 
Nerenz, 1982; Leventhal, Nerenz, & Straus, 1980), for 
example, has shown that an explanation for one's symptom 
is a basic component of the commonsense representation of 
illness; that is, the way in which the average individual 
thinks about illness. In addition, other authors have 
identified the importance of interpreting one's symptoms 
as a part of the decision to seek or not seek medical 
attention (Green et al., 1974; Gutmann et al.,1981; 
Hackett & Cassem, 1969; Hackett, Cassem, & Raker, 1973; 
Mathews et al., 1983; Safer, Tharps, Jackson, & Leventhal, 
1979; Suchman, 1965) 
Research on the connections between specific 
symptoms and their perceived causes has received little 
attention, yet there are a few noteworthy findings. For 
example, Baumann and Leventhal (1985) studied the beliefs 
of a nonpatient sample regarding the symptoms of elevated 
blood pressure. They found that individuals believed that 
changes in blood pressure could be detected by symptoms 
such as a flushed face, light-headedness, headache, and 
heart palpitations. Similarly, Pennebaker and Watson 
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(1988) found that subjects believed that symptoms of 
sweaty hands, tense stomach, fast pulse, warm or hot body, 
and headache correlate significantly with blood pressure 
levels. 
In other studies, investigators have noted that 
causal schemas (although not using this term) can 
interfere with an accurate assessment of a symptom, thus 
placing the individual at risk. It is known, for example, 
that many heart attack patients wait long periods of time 
before seeking medical help. From interviews with these 
patients it has been found that many individuals do not 
realize that their early symptoms are indicative of a 
cardiac problem. For example, Olin and Hackett (1964) 
reported that nearly half of the patients in their study 
believed that a painful chest discomfort was caused by 
indigestion or ulcers. Another 22% thought that they had 
a lung problem, leaving just below a third (31%) who 
thought about cardiac causes. 
In instances where cardiac patients do not have 
severe pain, chest symptoms can appear to be gastro-
intestinal in nature. Thus, if someone believes that 
their symptom is caused by something innocuous, there will 
not be a perceived need to seek medical help. In result, 
one will extend the time between symptom onset and the 
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realization that medical attention is necessary. This, in 
fact, has been reported in a study by Hackett and Cassem 
(1969) who found that patients took significantly less 
time getting to the hospital if they thought that their 
symptom was cardiac related. 
The availability of causes. It is suggested here 
that causal schemas provide a link between symptoms and 
their supposed causes. However, it would be simplistic 
to assume that the naive diagnostician tries to make a 
symptom attribution by considering every plausible cause. 
It is more likely that one calls to mind what he or she 
perceives to be the most likely reasons for the symptom 
(cf. Rodin, 1978). For example, when a young and healthy 
individual has a headache, causes such as stress, eye-
strain or sinus congestion will probably be considered 
before causes such as high blood pressure or brain tumors. 
Even though someone will recognize that all of these 
causes are possible, only the former tend to be common 
among young, healthy individuals. 
This highlights an important aspect of making 
symptom attributions. That is, the naive diagnostician 
probably considers the most available causes first. Such 
an action is based upon what Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 
1974) have termed the availability heuristic. This is an 
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implicit cognitive rule that leads one to estimate the 
probability of an event by how easily instances or occur-
rences can be brought to mind. Use of this heuristic does 
not mean that individuals will not consider causes that 
are less remote: they just won't consider them initially. 
Finding empirical support for the availability 
heuristic in the symptom perception literature is extreme-
ly difficult. In fact, only one article appears to 
present findings that could be interpreted in terms of 
this construct. 
Meyer, Leventhal, and Gutmann (1985) examined com-
monsense models of hypertension among individuals who were 
diagnosed with that condition. During an interview, 
subjects were asked if they could tell when their blood 
pressure was elevated. In brief, it was found that the 
longer people were diagnosed with hypertension, the more 
they were likely to believe that they could detect 
pressure changes by a specific symptom. Although it is 
currently believed that people cannot tell when their 
blood pressure is high (Isselbacher, Adams, Braunwald, 
Petersdorf, & Wilson, 1980), it would appear that hyper-
tension became increasingly more available to explain 
particular symptoms over time. 
It is expected that the availability of causes can 
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be based upon a number of factors. Blacks, for example, 
are probably more likely to think of sickle cell anemia 
than are Caucasians. The menstrual cycle is an easily 
available cause for some symptoms in women. And to coal 
miners, black lung disease is likely to be one of the 
first causes considered when faced with respiratory 
problems. Hence, health status, sex, race, and occupation 
are some of the factors that can affect the availability 
of causes. 
Causal cues. If causal schemas present connections 
between symptoms and their perceived causes, how does one 
make an attribution when there could be a variety of 
plausible explanations for a symptom? One possible 
mechanism is that the naive diagnostician makes use of 
causal cues that are found in the environment or recalled 
from memory. In essence, environmental cues can be 
construed as observations that aid in selecting a cause 
from a causal schema. For example, someone might be led 
to attribute their intestinal upset to the flu upon 
hearing a weather reporter say that "The flu season is 
upon us" (cf. Burnam & Pennebaker, 1977). Assuming that 
the flu is already one of the perceived causes for the 
symptom, the reporter's statement acts as a clue, guiding 
the selection of that cause. 
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In addition to observations, people can be induced 
to make attributions based upon suggestions from others. 
For example, someone who is experiencing stomach pain 
might come to believe that he is having an attack of 
appendicitis based upon a home diagnosis made by a friend 
or relative. In general, then, environmental causal cues 
can be thought of as external sources of information that 
raise the probability of selecting one particular per-
ceived cause over others. 
Memory causal cues can also be influential in 
selecting a cause for a symptom. Memories of family 
members suffering or dying from particular ailments, or 
recollections of prior experiences with a symptom can be 
instrumental in making an attribution. A young women, for 
example, whose mother died from cancer will no doubt be 
prone to think of this disease if she were to observe an 
unusual lump. The memory of her mother's ordeal might be 
strong enough to direct her in selecting cancer as a cause 
for any symptom where this disease is a possibility. 
A recent study was conducted by Cameron and Leven-
thal (1988) that demonstrates the influence of environ-
mental cues upon symptom attributions. In their study, 
college undergraduates were asked to imagine that they 
were experiencing a set of physical symptoms on the 
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following day. Participants read one of three sets of 
symptoms. These were: (1) an ambiguous set of six 
symptoms that had been previously rated by undergraduates 
as being strongly related to both illness and stress; (2) 
six mononucleosis symptoms; and (3) six diabetes symptoms. 
The participants were then asked to make an open-ended 
interpretation of the symptoms. After that, they were 
asked to rate the extent to which the symptoms could be 
due to stress and to an illness. For half of the 
participants, the following day was Saturday. For the 
other half, the following day was a day on which a midterm 
examination was scheduled. It was the investigators' 
belief that the midterm examination would act as an 
environmental stress cue, thus influencing individuals to 
attribute the hypothetical symptoms to stress. 
In line with expectations, Cameron and Leventhal 
(1988) found that when the stress cue was present, 73.5% 
of the participants mentioned a stress theme in their open 
ended response. When the stress cue was absent, only 
34.5% of the individuals mentioned a stress theme. In 
addition, participants provided higher stress ratings for 
the symptoms when the stress cue was present, and lower 
stress ratings when the cue was absent. 
Cue competition. Due to the sheer volume of 
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information that impinges upon someone throughout the day, 
it is possible that the naive diagnostician can encounter 
two or more causal cues. For example, someone with a 
headache might realize that he or she is worried about an 
impending tax audit (a causal cue for stress) and has 
recently been trying to catch up with a substantial amount 
of professional reading (a causal cue for eyestrain). 
These cues suggest different causes for the same symptom, 
and thus can be thought of as being in competition. If it 
is assumed that someone will attempt to make a singular 
attribution at any one time, then cue competition needs to 
be resolved. 
Resolution of cue competition can be accomplished in 
a number of ways. Sex differences, for example, might 
bias individuals into giving preference to cues that 
indicate different types of causes. For example, in 
studying cancer patients' adaptation to a dry colostomy1 , 
Sutherland, Orbach, Dyk and Bard (1952) found that men 
tended to attribute accidental spillage to dietary 
indiscretions while women tended to identify emotional 
upsets. 
Individual differences can also predispose people to 
bias their attention to or from certain types of cues. 
For example, individuals who are high on self monitoring 
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(Snyder, 1979) or field dependence (Witkin, 1959) might be 
prone to consider environmental cues over memory cues 
because they have a tendency to be vigilant for external 
information. Similarly, individuals whose fear is easily 
aroused might tend to avoid cues that point to a cause 
that provokes anxiety such as cancer or heart trouble. 
Recent research by Ditto, Jemmott, and Darley (1988) 
suggests that individuals, in general, might be inclined 
to ignore causal cues that indicate the presence of a 
serious disease or illness. In their study, college 
students were led to believe that they either exhibited or 
did not exhibit a "thioamine acetylase" (TAA) deficiency 
from a bogus saliva test that was conducted in the 
laboratory. Everyone was told that the TAA test was 
recently developed to identify individuals who are 
susceptible to a variety of pancreatic disorders. Results 
showed that the participants in the deficiency-present 
group displayed a lower sense of illness threat than those 
in the deficiency-absent group. In particular, the 
individuals in the former group felt that the TAA test had 
a greater false-positive rate, and that TAA deficiency was 
less life-threatening. The authors concluded that when 
people are faced with the threat of an illness, they 
attempt to reduce that threat by minimizing its serious-
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ness. Hence, it is possible that when individuals are 
faced with multiple causal cues, they might intuitively 
ignore the cues that suggest the presence of a serious 
illness. 
Another way of resolving cue competition is through 
salience. A cue becomes salient if it in some way is more 
noticeable than another. By this, it stands out in the 
foreground and becomes more available for use. Other 
researchers (e.g., McArthur & Post, 1977; Taylor & Fiske, 
1975) have manipulated salience and found it to affect 
attribution processes in other contexts. 
Resolution of cue competition through salience might 
provide an explanation for some of the findings in studies 
that have examined symptomatic experiences. Tonks, Rack 
and Rose (1968), for example, reported that women were 
less likely to commit suicide during the week prior to 
menstruation if they had experienced premenstrual 
symptoms. This was explained by noting that women tend to 
attribute their symptoms to bodily changes during this 
time. As such, this prevents them from focusing upon 
environmental factors such as hostility from others or 
stressful situational demands to explain feelings of 
depression and/or irritability. 
In the same vein, Rodin (1976) found that under 
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conditions of high test anxiety, women who were experi-
encing strong menstrual symptoms performed significantly 
better on a test than others who were not menstruating. 
she reasoned that symptomatic women did better because 
they could attribute an externally produced distress (test 
anxiety and fear of shock) to their own bodily changes. 
Non-menstruating women did not have the opportunity to 
make such an attribution for their similar sense of 
discomfort. Hence, in both studies it is possible that 
women's menstrual cycle cues were more salient than stress 
or anxiety cues, thus affecting attributions for their 
symptoms. 
Another example of cue salience can be found in the 
studies that have examined the reactions of medical 
students to the highly stressful and exhausting aspects of 
their professional training. It has been reported that 
about 70% of these students exhibit a form of hypochon-
driasis known as medical students' disease (Hunter, 
Lohrenz, & Schwartzman, 1964; Woods, Natterson, & Silver-
man, 1966). Characteristically, the stress imposed by 
medical education creates chronic physiological arousal 
which often precipitates identifiable symptoms such as 
heart palpitations. In reaction, some students make an 
attribution for their symptom that is similar to the 
diagnosis of some recently seen patient or clinical 
anecdote. Although it would be expected that medical 
students' disease should decrease over the time of 
training, Woods, Natterson, and Silverman (1966) found 
that it was observed with almost equal frequency 
throughout the four years of medical school. 
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Keeping in line with the notion of cue salience, 
medical students' disease is not that surprising. 
Although much of their symptomatology seems to be caused 
by stress, these students might find disease cues more 
salient out of the intense encounter with infirmity, both 
on the wards and in text books. 
Promoting Symptom Reattribution 
Expectancy/outcome incongruity. In studying the 
commonsense models of illness, Leventhal and his associ-
ates (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980; Leventhal & 
Nerenz, 1982; Meyer, Leventhal, & Gutmann, 1985) have 
asked patients with hypertension, cancer, and serious 
coronary problems to discuss the subjective understanding 
of their illness. In addition, Lau and Hartman (1983) 
have taken a somewhat similar approach toward typical, 
less severe types of sickness. Overall, it has been found 
that the common sense representation of illness possesses 
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five basic components: (1) determining the nature of 
one's problem (i.e., making a symptom attribution), (2) 
estimating the short- and long-term effects of the prob-
lem, (3) estimating the temporal course of the problem, 
(4) determining the factors that led to the onset of the 
problem (i.e., an illness attribution), and (5) deter-
mining how one goes about recovering from the problem. 
The second and third components of this model 
suggest that individuals have expectations about their 
perceived health problem. For example, if someone 
attributes a watery nasal discharge to a head cold, he or 
she will probably recognize the problem as being harmless, 
and expect to have this symptom for three or four days. 
If, on the other hand, it is believed that the flu is 
causing the symptom, one might expect to eventually be 
"laid up" for a couple of days with additional symptoms 
such as body aches and chills. Hence, expectations about 
future outcomes and experiences naturally follow from a 
symptom attribution. 
There might be instances, however, when an expected 
course of events does not match what really happens. For 
example, a person might attribute his symptoms to a head 
cold and then find himself confronted with nausea and 
vomiting. Likewise, someone might feel that he is coming 
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down with the flu, only to discover that his symptoms 
abate as soon as he leaves work. Hence, it is expected 
that the incongruity between one's attributional expec-
tations and the observed course of events will stimulate a 
reattribution. Moreover, the unexpected actions and 
sensations will provide the individual with information 
that will guide him or her in making a reattribution. 
The work of Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1981) has 
demonstrated that attributional processes are instigated 
when expectancies are disconfirmed. In their experiment, 
subjects were asked to observe and form an impression of 
another subject (really a confederate) in the context of 
what they believed was a study on "getting acquainted." 
Subjects were led to believe that the confederate would 
either agree or refuse to do a favor for the experimenter. 
During the study, the confederate either agreed or refused 
to do the favor, thus confirming or disconfirming sub-
jects' expectations. 
Later, subjects were given the opportunity to choose 
and examine the answers to any five questions on a 10 item 
questionnaire that was purported to have been completed by 
the confederate at an earlier time. Unknown to the 
subjects, the bogus questionnaire was made up of five 
"helping-relevant" items and five "interesting" items. 
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The former were perceived by a pretest sample to be useful 
in understanding why someone would either agree or refuse 
to do a favor for an experimenter in a psychology study. 
The latter questions were perceived as being interesting 
things to discover about someone upon an initial meeting. 
In essence, the results showed that subjects chose 
more helping-relevant items when expectancies were 
disconfirmed. Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1981} argue that 
the incongruity between expectations and outcomes insti-
gated attributional processing, and this was evidenced in 
the type of questions that were selected. In a similar 
way, it is expected that individuals will be instigated to 
make a reattribution for their symptom when outcomes do 
not match the expectancies that are based upon an initial 
attribution. 
The tendency to make a reattribution in the face of 
expectancy/outcome incongruity can also be understood in 
terms of cognitive dissonance. Carlsmith and Aronson 
(1963} have argued that dissonance is aroused when an 
event occurs that disconfirms an expectancy. In essence, 
one's cognition that an event is expected to occur is 
dissonant with the cognition that the event did not occur. 
In result, the true outcome is perceived as unpleasant. 
This could lead one to reconsider initial expectations. 
32 
Persuasion. Another way in which a person can make 
a reattribution is to be persuaded to do so. Here, 
persuasion refers to the attempt at having someone accept 
a new attribution for the same symptomatic experience. It 
does not mean that one is trying to persuade another into 
believing in a fallacious cure. Overall, persuasion 
probably occurs most frequently in the doctor's office. 
Much of the research done on persuasion has focused 
on attitudes and opinions. This is a line of work that 
was started by Carl Hovland and his associates at Yale 
University (e.g., see Oskamp, 1977). However, some of 
that work seems applicable in the context of symptom 
attributions. For example, in studying the effects of a 
persuasive communication it has been repeatedly found that 
a message from a high credibility source produces more 
attitude change than one from a low credibility source 
(see Insko, 1967 for a review). This finding would 
suggest that people will be more likely to make a 
reattribution if persuaded by a credible individual. 
Obviously, health professionals, especially doctors, have 
this credential. It is they who can persuade one to 
believe that a stomach pain is being caused by an ulcer, 
not "nerves" as one might have initially expected. 
In addition to source credibility, a person's level 
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of persuasibility might also influence the degree to which 
they can be influenced in accepting a new attribution. 
someone who is high in persuasibility might change an 
attribution at the suggestion of almost anyone. Those who 
are low in persuasibility might require a credible source 
before making such a change. 
A study that demonstrates symptom reattribution 
through persuasion was done by Storms and Nisbett (1970) 
with insomniacs. It has been known since the mid 1960's 
that when trying to fall asleep, insomniacs experience 
high levels of autonomic arousal. Frequently, they 
complain of symptoms such as accelerated heart rate, 
increased body temperature, racing thoughts and sweating. 
These authors have argued that insomniacs tend to 
exacerbate their condition with pejorative self 
inferences. That is, they believe that their sleep 
problem is caused by internal factors that are out of 
control. 
In the Storms and Nisbett (1970) study, participants 
with sleep disturbances were recruited for a dream 
research project. Some were informed that a pill (really 
a placebo) they had to ingest prior to retiring would have 
the effect of increasing their level of arousal. In 
essence, these subjects were told that their familiar 
) 
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bedtime symptoms would be caused by some other outside 
factor (persuasion). Another group of similar subjects 
was told that the pill would lower their level of arousal 
and relax them (a fallacious cure). 
It was expected that subjects in the first group 
would be able to reattribute their sensations to an 
external source, thus making them less anxious about their 
inability to sleep. It was predicted that these subjects 
would fall asleep in less time than usual. It was also 
expected that subjects in the second group would not have 
an external source to attribute presleep sensations. As 
such, their emotional discomfort should be escalated 
because they would be experiencing symptoms in lieu of 
expected tranquilization. Here it was predicted that 
subjects would be kept awake longer than usual. 
The results of the study confirmed these 
predictions. Subjects in the first group reported 
decreased sleep onset latencies of about twelve minutes. 
The other subjects reported increased latencies of about 
fifteen minutes. It would appear, then, that people can 
be persuaded to consider another cause for their symptom 
after an initial attribution has been made. 
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l._nhibiting Symptom Reattribution 
Expectancy/outcome congruity. Up to this point, the 
discussion has been focused upon processes that could 
promote or enhance reattribution. It is possible, 
however, that once the naive diagnostician has identified 
a cause, he or she might be subject to factors or condi-
tions that will inhibit a reattribution. In other words, 
there might be situations in which one could be led to 
maintain an initial attribution. 
It was noted earlier that the research findings of 
Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1981) indicated that discon-
firmed expectancies about a confederate's behavior led to 
a greater amount of attributional processing by subjects. 
This, however, was contrasted by the finding that con-
firmed expectancies led to less (if any) attributional 
processing. The authors found a highly significant 
expectancy-by-behavior crossed interaction. Pyszczynski 
and Greenberg (1981) suggest that the observation of 
expected outcomes inhibits (or at least does not promote) 
attributional processing because the expectancy acts as a 
pre-existing explanation for the observation. Hence, it 
would appear that there is no intuitive need to engage in 
causal reasoning when expectancies are confirmed. 
This finding has been evidenced in other studies 
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that have examined the relationship between attribution 
and expectancies (Jones & Harris, 1967; Jones, worchel, 
Goethals & Grumet, 1971; Rosenfield & Stephan, 1977). For 
example, Jones et al. (1971) told subjects that another 
student on campus either favored or opposed marijuana 
legislation. Subjects then read an essay by this student 
that either favored or opposed marijuana legislation. 
Half the subjects were told that the student was forced 
into writing the essay, while the other half was told that 
the student freely chose to write the essay. In result, 
it was found that the degree of choice did not influence 
subjects' attributions when there was congruity between 
the nature of the student's position (i.e., the expec-
tancy) and the nature of the essay discussion. 
Given these research findings, it could be reasoned 
that when the expectancies based upon an attribution are 
congruent with outcomes, the naive diagnostician will not 
desire to make a reattribution. Hence, if someone 
attributes nasal congestion to the flu and soon afterwards 
experiences a fever with muscle aches, there would be no 
reason to assume that another cause is operating. 
Attribution perseveration. There is some research 
which indicates that individuals have a tendency to 
maintain an attribution even if they are informed that the 
37 
attribution is erroneous (Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, 1975; 
Ross, Lepper, Strack and Steinmetz, 1977). For example, 
Ross et al. (1975) conducted a study in which success and 
failure on an experimental task was manipulated. Even 
though subjects were informed later that their performance 
was controlled by the experimenter, successful subjects 
continued to believe that they had higher task abilities 
with respect to those who had failed. Rodin (1978) has 
noted that attribution perseveration is thought to be an 
information processing phenomenon. It would appear that 
once information (i.e., an attribution) is coded, it 
becomes independent of the original coding scheme. Hence, 
the information is no longer affected by that scheme or 
any other information. 
In a related study, Ross et al. (1977) asked sub-
jects to read a case history of someone who had psycho-
logical problems. They were then asked to imagine that 
this person either committed suicide or made a financial 
contribution to the Peace Corps. Subjects were also asked 
to create an explanation for this event. After this, 
subjects rated the likelihood of these events actually 
happening for the person in the case history. In result, 
it was found that subjects who envisioned and explained 
suicide perceived this event to be more likely in 
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comparison to those who thought about the Peace Corps 
contribution. Likewise, those who imagined and explained 
the contribution saw it as being more likely than those 
who thought about suicide. Hence, these results suggest 
that merely thinking about an event raises the subjective 
probability of its reality. 
If it is true that individuals have a tendency to 
maintain an attribution, then it would be reasonable to 
assume that the naive diagnostician will naturally not 
want to make a symptom reattribution. As such, he or she 
would give attention to attribution-relevant experiences, 
and ignore signs and symptoms that indicate the possi-
bility of other causes. 
Conclusion 
In this presentation, it has been argued that little 
is known about symptom attribution processes. Although 
there are two explanatory models in the literature, both 
have been generated from laboratory research and do not 
necessarily describe how individuals make symptom attri-
butions on a day-to-day basis. If the thoughts and 
actions of the naive diagnostician are to be understood, 
research needs to focus upon how individuals make symptom 
attributions in their natural environment. This will 
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identify basic facts that can be used for future research, 
both theoretical and applied -- in the laboratory and in 
the field. 
Both symptom attribution models have been described 
in this presentation. However, other social psychological 
constructs such as causal schemas, the availability 
heuristic, and causal cues have been discussed in terms of 
their relevance to the naive diagnostician. In addition, 
processes that might promote reattributions (i.e., expec-
tancy/outcome incongruity and persuasion) as well as 
inhibit reattributions (i.e., expectancy/outcome congruity 
and attribution perseverance) have been offered. 
Conceivably, these constructs could be integrated 
into a model that represents a symptom attribution pro-
cess. The present research, however, was not approached 
with a model as the starting point. Using the above 
constructs as a guide, data were collected with the intent 
of constructing a symptom attribution model as the 
endpoint of the study. It was felt that this would be 
more beneficial for gaining insight into the true nature 
of the naive diagnostician. 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH INVESTIGATION 
The present investigation was organized into two 
parts. In Study 1, subjects were asked to identify causes 
for each of five common symptoms. The purpose of this was 
to undertake a detailed analysis of the number and type of 
causes that were generated. This was done to learn basic 
facts about symptom attributions before time and resources 
were devoted to an investigation of actual self-diagnosis. 
The major focus of Study 2 was to examine the 
attributional activity of individuals who encountered a 
real symptom. Within the context of a survey, subjects 
were asked to describe thoughts and actions that occurred 
throughout the course of a recent symptomatic experience. 
Most importantly, they were asked to identify the causes 
or self-diagnoses that came to mind during that time. 
The organization of the survey was based upon the 
assumption that a symptom attribution is initially formed 
with the aid of informational cues and is then affected by 
a diversity of subsequent experience. As such, one's 
initial attribution is likely to be strengthened or 
weakened by the information and experiences that occur 
over time. This implies that the naive diagnostician is 
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influenced by easily attainable information. Given the 
lack of professional training, it is presumed that he or 
she is unable to effectively distinguish medically 
relevant from medically irrelevant data. Hence, almost 
any kind of information could be useful. This would not 
seem to be an efficacious method of self-diagnosis; 
however, it is probably the best that one can generally 
do. 
Sources of information such as lay conferral, the 
perception of being sick, medical guides, health pro-
fessionals, and the outcome of self-treatment were 
examined in terms of their potential for strengthening or 
weakening the belief in one's symptom attribution. It was 
predicted that when beliefs are strengthened, people will 
be likely to maintain their attributions. When belief in 
one's attribution is weakened, it was predicted that he or 
she will be prone to make a reattribution, one that is 
consistent with new information. 
Each of the above sources is discussed in more 
detail later. However, the data analysis for Study 2 
sought to answer two basic questions: {1) to what extent 
do individuals encounter information from the above 
sources, and {2) to what extent to they promote and 
inhibit the tendency to make a symptom reattribution? 
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College students were used for both studies. 
Although an older group of individuals might have a more 
diverse experience with symptomatology, it was expected 
that college students would be equally inclined to make 
symptom attributions. College students have been used in 
other health and symptom perception studies with success 
(e.g., see Bishop & Converse, 1986; Cameron & Leventhal, 
1988; Comstock & Slome, 1973; Cox, 1983; Krantz, Baum & 
Wideman, 1980; Lau, 1982; Lau & Hartman, 1983; Moos & van 
Dort, 1977; Pennebaker, 1982; Pennebaker, Burnam, 
Schaeffler & Harper, 1977; Pennebaker & Skelton, 1981; 
Pennebaker & Watson, 1988; Peterson, 1986; Weinstein, 
1982). Moreover, the principal investigator has collected 
symptom attribution data from college students in the past 
and has found that meaningful responses were obtained. 
METHOD FOR STUDY 1 
subjects 
The subjects for this study were 35 introductory 
psychology students who received course credit for their 
participation. The demographic characteristics of these 
individuals are displayed in Table 1. As it can be seen, 
the subjects were predominately female, Caucasian, fresh-
men who were enrolled in non-health oriented curricula. 
No one was a trained health professional. The mean age of 
subjects was 18.46 years (SD• 1.12). 
Instruments 
All participants completed two short instruments 
that were affixed together in a questionnaire labeled 
"SYMPTOM SURVEY" (see Appendix A}. The first was a 
demographic data sheet that collected basic information 
about the responder. The form asked individuals to 
identify their gender, age, racial affiliation, grade 
point average 2 , and position at the university. The data 
sheet also asked responders if they were enrolled in a 
health professions curriculum or were a practicing health 
professional. 
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Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of the Subjects in Study ! 
-------------------------------------------------------
Characteristic 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Racial Affiliation 
Caucasian 
Black 
Hispanic 
Oriental / Asian 
Other 
student Rank 
Freshman 
Sophomore 
Junior 
Senior 
Frequencya 
10 
25 
23 
2 
1 
8 
1 
26 
4 
4 
1 
Relative 
Frequency 
.29 
.71 
.66 
.06 
.03 
.23 
.03 
.74 
.11 
.11 
.03 
(table continues) 
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-------------------------------------------------------
Characteristic 
curriculum 
Health Professions 
Other 
Frequencya 
6 
29 
Relative 
Frequency 
.17 
.83 
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The second instrument asked subjects to identify 
what they believed to be the causes for a set of five 
common symptoms: headache, watery eyes, congested nose, 
upset stomach, and sore throat. These symptoms were 
chosen because they were found to be the most frequently 
experienced by a group of college students who were 
surveyed at an earlier time. In an effort to control for 
presentation effects, the five symptoms were presented in 
random order to each subject (cf. Underwood, 1966}. 
For each symptom, participants were asked to list 
all of the causes that came to mind. They were informed 
that there were no right or wrong answers on the task, and 
were provided with 15 spaces upon which answers could be 
written. In addition, there was a note on the bottom of 
each page that told the participant to use the backside of 
the paper if needed. 
Procedure 
The subjects who volunteered for this study met 
collectively at a designated time and place. At the 
beginning of the session, the experimenter welcomed every-
one and announced that the purpose of the study was to ask 
a group of individuals to identify what they believed to 
be the causes for a set of symptoms. The experimenter 
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emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers on 
this task, and that it was important to write down 
anything that came to mind. It was also announced that 
there was no time limit for the task; participants could 
take as much time as needed. At that point, everyone was 
given a copy of the Symptom Survey to complete. 
Research Questions and Data Analysis 
There were three main questions that guided the data 
analysis for Study 1. These questions are listed below 
with the procedures that were used to answer them. 
Question 1: WHAT TYPES OF CAUSES WERE IDENTIFIED BY 
SUBJECTS? 
To answer this question, the perceived causes for 
each of the five symptoms (N • 911) were copied onto 
individual index cards. These cards were separated 
according to symptom type and were then sorted into piles 
in order to identify themes of responses. From this, 
categories were developed for each of the five symptoms. 
Subjects' perceived causes were then classified and 
tallied. 
The categories of perceived causes (N = 64) were 
then classified according to the dimensions of locus, 
stability, and controllability. These are three 
dimensions that have been posited by Weiner (1979) to 
underlie causal attributions (also see Russell, 1982). 
This was done in order to examine the nature of the 
48 
perceived causes that were identified by subjects. For 
example, if individuals tended to list causes that were 
forms of illness or were serious in nature, it was 
presumed that most of the categories would be classified 
as internal, stable, and uncontrollable (e.g., a brain 
tumor). On the other hand, if perceived causes tended to 
be transient or innocuous influences, then it would be 
expected that most of the categories would be classified 
as external, unstable, and controllable (e.g., stress). 
Classifying the causes of symptoms with Weiner's 
(1979) dimensions posed some difficulties. After all, his 
tripartite scheme was originally proposed to codify the 
causes of behavior, not physical symptoms. However, other 
investigators such as Dobbins (1988), and Dobbins and 
Wallston (1987) have been successful in studying arthritis 
patients' perceptions of their conditions in terms of the 
related dimensions of internality, stability, and 
globality. 3 Thus it was felt that Weiner's scheme could 
be used for the present study if appropriate and careful 
criteria were established. 
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The dimension of locus was one of the most difficult 
to classify. This is because most causes appeared to have 
both an internal and external nature. For example, a flu 
virus originates outside one's body, yet it has to be 
internalized before one begins to feel symptoms of the 
flu. Thus, if subjects report that the flu is a possible 
cause for a congested nose, should this be classified as 
internal or external? To confuse matters even more, it 
would seem that any cause would have to be internalized to 
~ degree before it could have an effect upon an indi-
vidual. Does this then suggest that all causes should be 
classified as internal? As it can be seen, the develop-
ment of classification criteria was necessary. 
In response to the difficulties posed by this task, 
the following criteria were used. A cause was considered 
EXTERNAL if it referred to an observable physical influ-
ence (i.e., an event, entity, or activity) that is 
outside one's body and is present at the time a symptom 
appears or shortly before it appears. A cause was 
considered INTERNAL if it referred to an influence that 
takes place primarily within the body before or while a 
symptom is perceived. Thus, if one were considering a 
headache, causes such as loud noises, hot weather, and 
noxious fumes would be classified as external; while 
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fatigue, eye strain, and an allergy would be classified as 
internal. 
A cause was considered STABLE if it referred to an 
influence that is relatively permanent or has the nature 
of lasting for a considerable period of time. A cause was 
considered UNSTABLE if it referred to an influence that is 
short-lived or temporary in nature. Thus, an allergy and 
a brain tumor would be classified as stable causes for a 
headache; while a cold, stress, and overexertion would be 
classified as unstable. 
A cause was considered CONTROLLABLE if one could 
potentially prevent the cause from happening, or if one 
could alleviate a symptom by affecting the cause without 
the need of professional medical help. 4 Causes that did 
not meet at least one of these two criteria were con-
sidered UNCONTROLLABLE. Hence, a hangover, fatigue, and 
eye strain would be classified as controllable causes of a 
headache; while a brain tumor and an allergy would be 
classified as uncontrollable. 
After the categories of perceived causes were 
classified in terms of locus, stability and control-
lability, the occurrences of the levels of each dimension 
were tallied and compared with one-way chi-square tests. 
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Question 2: DOES THE NUMBER OF PERCEIVED CAUSES VARY AS A 
FUNCTION OF SYMPTOM TYPE? 
To answer this question, participants received an 
enumeration score for each of the five symptoms. This 
score was operationally defined as the number of perceived 
causes that were listed. However, enumeration was 
construed as a measure of the extent to which someone 
could imagine or think of possible causes for a symptom. 
In other words, the enumeration score was viewed as the 
degree to which causes of symptoms "come to mind." 
It was expected that enumeration scores would vary 
among the symptoms because peoples' experiences with 
symptoms vary. For example, some symptoms (an upset 
stomach) occur more frequently than others (a nose 
bleed). 5 Likewise, some symptoms (a headache) are 
discussed frequently and receive a high degree of media 
attention, while others (an ear ache) are hardly ever the 
object of discussion or the focus of a highly publicized 
health report. As such, it is possible that peoples' 
variable experience with symptoms might lead them to think 
about more possible causes for one symptom over another. 
The enumeration scores were used in a repeated 
measures analysis of variance to test the null hypothesis 
that the tendency to think of possible causes did not vary 
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among the five symptoms in the study. A Student-Neuman-
Keuls post-hoc analysis (cf. Winer, 1971) was chosen to be 
used if the result of the ANOVA was statistically 
significant. 
Question 3: HOW MUCH OF THE VARIANCE IN THE ENUMERATION 
SCORES FOR A SYMPTOM IS EXPLAINED BY THE 
VARIANCE IN DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AS WELL 
AS THE VARIANCE IN THE ENUMERATION SCORES 
FOR THE OTHER SYMPTOMS? 
To answer this question, hierarchical linear 
multiple regression analyses (cf. Cohen & Cohen, 1975) 
were conducted. There were five analyses - one for each 
of the symptoms in Study 1. All the analyses were 
conducted in two steps. On step 1, a set of demographic 
variables was entered as the first component of the 
regression equation. The set consisted of age, gender, 
and two dummy variables that reflected racial affiliation 
(Caucasian vs. non-Caucasian) and curriculum (health 
professions vs. other). 6 On step 2, a single score was 
entered. This was the average of the enumeration scores 
for the four other symptoms. 7 Thus, when the variance in 
enumeration scores for a headache was being explained, the 
enumeration scores for watery eyes, congested nose, upset 
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stomach, and sore throat were averaged and entered on step 
2 of the analysis. 
It was reasonable to assume that demographic charac-
teristics would be related to attribution processes. 
Other studies have found that college students experience 
symptoms as a function of their year in school (Comstock & 
Slome, 1973; Greenly & Mechanic, 1976; Moos & Van Dort, 
1977). Moreover, Pennebaker et al. (1977) found that 
female college students tend to be more symptomatic than 
males over time. As such, it is possible that demographic 
variables might also be related to symptom attribution 
processes. 
It was difficult to predict how the average enumer-
ation score for step 2 of the regression analysis would 
behave. However, if there is a consistency in the way 
that causes for symptoms come to mind, it would be 
expected that this score would correlate directly and 
reliably with the criterion score in each regression 
equation. 
RESULTS FOR STUDY l 
The Perceived Causes for Five Symptoms (Question 11 
Types of perceived causes. The categories of 
perceived causes for each of the five symptoms are listed 
in Tables 2 through 6. Overall, these tables share three 
basic findings. 
First, subjects identified a variety of attributions 
for each of the symptoms. In all, 64 categories of 
perceived causes were identified. Eleven to 15 categories 
were found to be associated with each of the symptoms. 
Second, each table shows considerable variation in 
terms of the number of individuals who mentioned a par-
ticular cause. It can be seen that there are some causes 
that were identified by most everyone, and some that were 
mentioned by only a few. As an example, Table 2 shows 
that stress was identified as a possible cause for a 
headache by nearly three quarters of the subjects, while 
noxious fumes was mentioned by only four individuals. 
Figure 1 examines the variability for each of the 
five symptoms by displaying the proportions of subjects 
who mentioned a particular cause. The abscissa identifies 
perceived causes in generic order (i.e., first, second, 
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Table 2 
The Perceived Causes for ~ Headache 
Category of Relative 
Perceived Cause Frequencya Frequency 
stress/ter;i.sionb 26 .74 
Fatigueb 19 .54 
Emotional distressb 18 . 51 
A coldb 16 .46 
Loud noises 13 .37 
Head injury 13 .37 
An illnessb 12 .34 
Lack of food 12 .34 
Alcohol/drugsb 11 .31 
Overexertionb 10 .29 
Eye strainb 9 .26 
Problem with head organs 8 .23 
Hot/cold weatherb 6 .17 
Allergyb 5 .14 
Noxious fumes/smokeb 4 .11 
aN• 35. bA perceived cause that is identified with at 
least one other symptom. 
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Table 3 
!!}_! Perceived Causes for Watery Eyes 
---------------------------------------------------
Category of Relative 
Perceived Cause Frequencya Frequency 
---------------------------------------------------
Particle in the eye 
Smoke/fumesb 
t . b Emo ions 
Allergyb 
contact lenses 
Fatigueb 
A coldb 
Eye trauma 
Eye illness (e.g., infection) 
Eye strainb 
Illness (other) 
Liquid irritants 
(e.g., chlorinated water) 
Drugs/alcoholb 
26 .74 
22 .63 
19 .54 
19 .54 
16 .46 
14 .40 
12 .34 
10 .29 
8 .23 
8 .23 
6 .17 
5 .14 
4 .11 
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a N• 35. bA perceived cause that is identified with at 
least one other symptom. 
Table 4 
~ Perceived Causes for ~ Congested Nose 
category of 
Perceived Cause 
A coldb 
Allergyb 
Frequencya 
34 
18 
weather (e.g., dry air, cold)b 10 
Flub 8 
crying/worrying 
Respiratory problem 
(e.g., sinusitus) 
Drugs/alcoholb 
Foreign object in nose 
Covered or blocked nostrils 
Fatigueb 
Not caring for oneself 
properly (e.g., not 
dressing for the weather)b 
7 
6 
4 
4 
4 
2 
2 
Relative 
Frequency 
.97 
.51 
.29 
.23 
.20 
.17 
.11 
.11 
.11 
.06 
.06 
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aN• 35. bA perceived cause that is identified with at 
least one other symptom. 
Table 5 
The Perceived Causes for an Upset Stomach 
Category of 
Perceived cause Frequencya 
Eating/drinking too much 
Junk/spicy food 
Emotional distressb 
Spoiled/bad food 
Not eating 
Flub 
Gic illness (e.g., ulcer) 
Stressb 
Overexertion/activityb 
Gastrointestinal irregularity 
(e.g., indigestion) 
Illness other than Gib 
Menstruation 
Bad odors 
Punched in the stomach 
29 
19 
19 
17 
15 
14 
10 
10 
7 
7 
6 
4 
3 
2 
Relative 
Frequency 
.83 
.54 
.54 
.49 
.43 
.40 
.29 
.29 
.20 
.20 
.17 
.11 
.09 
.06 
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aN• 35. bA perceived cause that is identified with at 
least one other symptom. cGastrointestinal. 
Table 6 
The Perceived Causes for ~ Sore Throat 
Category of 
Perceived Cause Frequencya 
A coldb 25 
Infection (e.g., tonsillitis) 21 
vocal Strain 19 
Throat irritation 
(e.g., hot foods) 
Illness (other)b 
Cold/rainy weatherb 
Not caring for oneself properly 
(e.g., not dressing for the 
18 
11 
11 
weather)b 7 
Poor diet 
Emotionsb 
Allergyb 
Fatigueb 
6 
4 
3 
2 
Relative 
Frequency 
.71 
.60 
.54 
.51 
.31 
.31 
.20 
.17 
.11 
.09 
.06 
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a N• 35. bA perceived cause that is identified with at 
least one other symptom. 
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third, etc.). This refers to the order of the first 
eleven causes as they are listed in Tables 2-6. Most of 
the plots in Figure 1 show a comparable pattern. However, 
the plot for a congested nose shows that almost everyone 
mentioned the first cause (a cold) and that the propor-
tions of subjects mentioning subsequent causes are notably 
lower than that of the other symptoms. This indicates 
that some symptoms are associated with a major or predomi-
nant cause. It is not clear why this happens, but it 
might be related to peoples' limited experience with 
certain symptoms or to the fact that some symptoms have a 
limited number of real causes. 
The third basic finding is that Tables 2 through 6 
show that a substantial proportion of the perceived causes 
are shared, to some degree, among the five symptoms. On 
average, it was found that 59% of the perceived causes for 
any one symptom were identified with at least one other 
symptom. For example, stress was mentioned as a possible 
cause for a headache as well as an upset stomach. An 
allergy was identified as a potential cause for a head-
ache, sore throat, watery eyes, and a congested nose. In 
all, there were 13 perceived causes that were associated 
with two or more symptoms; these were stress, fatigue, 
emotions, alcohol/drugs, hot/cold weather, an allergy, 
flu, an "illness," a cold, not caring for oneself 
properly, overexertion, eyestrain, and fumes/smoke. 
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Dimensionality of perceived causes. Table 7 
displays the frequency distributions of the dimensions of 
locus, stability, and controllability for the perceived 
causes of all five symptoms. For this table, however, it 
should be noted that only single occurrences of a cause 
were used for analysis. As such, the 13 symptom attri-
butions that are mentioned above were accounted for only 
once. Thus of the 64 perceived causes that are listed in 
Tables 2 through 6, only 39 were used for the analyses in 
Table 7 (i.e., 25 causes were second, third, or fourth 
occurrences). Hence, the analyses examined the causal 
dimensions for a set of unique perceived causes. 
Overall, the chi-square analyses indicate that 
subjects identified causes that are predominately 
internal, unstable, and controllable. This means that 
there was a tendency to think of relatively harmless or 
manageable types of causes for the symptoms that were 
presented. Tables 2 through 6 show that many of the 
listings are common, everyday types of events or 
occurrences. 
Among the three causal dimensions, locus and 
controllability showed the least response tendency. The 
Table 7 
Frequency Distributions of the Dimensions of Locus, 
stability, and Controllability for the Perceived 
causes of the Five Symptoms in Study ! 
Dimension Frequency 
Locus 
External 
Internal 
Stability 
Stable 
Unstable 
controllability 
Controllable 
13 
26 
6 
33 
27 
uncontrollable 12 
Relative 
Frequency 
.33 
.66 
.15 
.85 
.69 
.31 
Chi-Square 
Value 
4.333 
18.692 
5.769 
p 
.0374 
<. 0001 
.0163 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1 and N• 39. The null 
hypothesis for these and other one-way chi-square 
analyses was that category frequencies were statisti-
cally equivalent. 
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ratio of internal:external and controllable:uncontrollable 
perceived causes were 2:1 and 2.25:1, respectively. In 
contrast, however, the ratio of unstable:stable perceived 
causes was 5.5:1. These results indicate that subjects 
showed a response tendency on all three causal dimensions, 
but it was substantially more pronounced for the dimension 
of stability. 
Enumeration as ! Function of Symptom ~ (Question £1_ 
The results of the repeated measures analysis of 
variance and post-hoc test on the enumeration data are 
displayed in Table a.a The ANOVA suggests that the mean 
enumeration scores for an upset stomach, watery eyes, and 
headache are equivalent. Subjects provided statistically 
lower enumeration scores for a congested nose and sore 
throat. 
Explaining Enumeration Variance (Question 11 
The results of the linear multiple regression 
analyses on the enumeration scores for the five symptoms 
are depicted in Tables 9 through la. It should be noted 
that the analysis for each symptom occupies two tables in 
order to account for the two steps of the hierarchical 
multiple regression. For example, the results of the 
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Table 8 
ANOVA Summary Table and Post-Hoc Analysis of the Mean 
Enumeration Scores for the Five Symptoms in Study ! 
source of 
variation 
Symptom Type 
Within Cell 
Congested 
Nose 
3.37a 
(1.63) 
SS 
223.337 
351.863 
Sore 
Throat 
4.46 
(2.21) 
DF 
4 
136 
Upset 
Stomach 
5.83 
(2.33) 
MS 
55.834 
2.587 
Watery 
Eyes 
5.91 
( 2. 42) 
F p 
21.581 <.0005 
Headache 
( 2. 03) 
aThe means and (standard deviations) of the enumeration 
scores. bThe means of the underlined symptoms do not 
differ statistically. 
Table 9 
step ! of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for a Headache 
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---------------------------~-----------------------------
MULTIPLE R .378 
R2 
.143 
ADJUSTED R2 .029 
STANDARD ERROR 2.005 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION 
DF SS MS F p 
REGRESSION 4 20.091 5.023 1. 250 .3114 
RESIDUAL 30 120.594 4.020 
---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T p 
HPS 1. 519 .934 .286 1. 626 .1144 
GN .876 .760 .197 1.153 .2582 
RA .174 .727 .041 .239 .8125 
AGE -.089 .313 -.049 -.285 .7780 
(A) 6.226 6.073 1. 025 .3134 
Table 10 
step ~ of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for a Headache 
MULTIPLE R .534 
R2 
.285 R2 CHANGE 
ADJUSTED R2 .162 
STANDARD ERROR 1.863 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION 
DF SS MS F p 
REGRESSION 5 40.087 8.017 2.311 .0696 
RESIDUAL 29 100.599 3.469 
67 
.142 
---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T 
HPS .809 .917 .152 .882 
GN .787 .707 .177 1.113 
RA .087 .676 .021 .129 
AGE -.010 .293 -.005 -.033 
MEANa .488 .203 .406 2.401 
(A) 2.704 5.829 .464 
aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than 
headache. 
p 
.3851 
.2749 
.8981 
.9735 
.0230 
.6461 
Table 11 
step ! of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for Watery Eyes 
MULTIPLE R .482 
R2 
.232 
ADJUSTED R2 .130 
STANDARD ERROR 2.255 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION 
DF SS MS F p 
REGRESSION 4 46.161 11.540 2.269 .0851 
RESIDUAL 30 152.582 5.086 
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___ .....,. ___________ 
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T p 
HPS 2.558 1.051 .405 2.434 .0211 
GN .647 .855 .123 .756 .4554 
RA .490 .817 .098 .599 .5534 
AGE -.291 .353 -.135 -.826 .4151 
(A) 9.423 6.831 1.380 .1779 
Table 12 
SteE ~ of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for Watery Eyes 
MULTIPLE R .728 
R2 
.530 R2 CHANGE 
ADJUSTED R2 .449 
STANDARD ERROR 1.794 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION 
OF SS MS F p 
REGRESSION 5 105.368 21.074 6.545 .0003 
RESIDUAL 29 93.375 3.220 
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.298 
---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T 
HPS 1.460 .874 .231 1.670 
GN .426 .682 .081 .624 
RA .400 .651 .080 .614 
AGE -.188 .282 -.087 -.669 
MEANa .919 .214 .580 4.288 
(A) 3.530 5.606 .630 
aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than 
watery eyes. 
p 
.1058 
.5372 
.5438 
.5087 
.0002 
.5339 
Table 13 
step ! of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for ~ Congested Nose 
MULTIPLE R 
R2 
ADJUSTED R2 
STANDARD ERROR 
ANALYSIS 
DF 
.289 
.084 
-.039 
1. 660 
OF VARIANCE 
SS 
FOR REGRESSION 
MS F p 
REGRESSION 4 7.516 1. 879 .682 .6099 
RESIDUAL 30 82.655 2.755 
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---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T p 
HPS 1. 045 .773 .245 1. 351 .1868 
GN -.221 .629 -.062 -.351 .7277 
RA -.295 .602 -.087 -.491 .6269 
AGE .198 .260 .136 .763 .4513 
(A) .110 5.027 .022 .9827 
Table 14 
Step ~ of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for ~ Congested Nose 
MULTIPLE R .637 
R2 
.406 R2 CHANGE 
ADJUSTED R2 .303 
STANDARD ERROR 1. 360 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION 
OF SS MS F p 
REGRESSION 5 36.571 7.314 3.957 .0074 
RESIDUAL 29 53.600 1. 848 
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.322 
---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T 
HPS .110 .676 .026 .163 
GN -.493 .520 -.139 -.948 
RA -.470 .495 -.139 -.951 
AGE .337 .215 .232 1.566 
MEANa .594 .150 .631 3.965 
(A) -5.085 4.321 -1.177 
aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than 
congested nose. 
p 
.8718 
.3512 
.3494 
.1282 
.0004 
.2488 
Table 15 
step ! of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for an Upset Stomach 
MULTIPLE R 
R2 
ADJUSTED R2 
STANDARD ERROR 
ANALYSIS 
DF 
.408 
.166 
.055 
2.267 
OF VARIANCE 
SS 
FOR REGRESSION 
MS F p 
REGRESSION 4 30.784 7.696 1.497 .2279 
RESIDUAL 30 154.187 5.140 
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---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T p 
HPS 1.672 1. 056 .274 1.583 .1239 
GN .429 .860 .084 .498 .6218 
RA .769 .822 .159 .936 .3569 
AGE -.414 .354 -.199 -1.167 .2522 
(A) 11. 940 6.867 1. 739 .0923 
Table 16 
step ~ of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for an Upset Stomach 
MULTIPLE R 
R2 
ADJUSTED R2 
STANDARD ERROR 
ANALYSIS 
DF 
.589 
.347 
.234 
2.041 
OF VARIANCE 
SS 
R2 CHANGE 
FOR REGRESSION 
MS F p 
REGRESSION 5 64.131 12.826 3.078 .0239 
RESIDUAL 29 120.841 4.167 
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.180 
---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T p 
HPS .740 1. 007 .121 .735 .4684 
GN .235 .777 .046 .302 .7649 
RA .750 .740 .155 1. 014 .3191 
AGE -.360 .320 - .173 -1.127 .2692 
MEANa .658 .233 .457 2.829 .0084 
(A) 8.131 6.328 1. 285 .2090 
aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than upset 
stomach. 
Table 17 
step ! of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for ! Sore Throat 
MULTIPLE R 
R2 
ADJUSTED R2 
STANDARD ERROR 
ANALYSIS 
OF 
.145 
.021 
-.109 
2.332 
OF VARIANCE 
SS 
FOR REGRESSION 
MS F p 
REGRESSION 4 3.518 .879 .162 .9561 
RESIDUAL 30 163.168 5.439 
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---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T p 
HPS .545 1. 087 .094 .502 .6193 
GN -.123 .884 -.025 -.139 .8904 
RA -.254 .845 -.055 -.301 .7658 
AGE -.143 .365 -.073 -.393 .6967 
(A) 7.389 7.064 1. 046 .3039 
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Table 18 
Step ~ of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the 
Enumeration Scores for a Sore Throat 
MULTIPLE R .733 
R2 
.537 R2 CHANGE .516 
ADJUSTED R2 .457 
STANDARD ERROR 1. 631 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION 
DF SS MS F p 
REGRESSION 5 89.547 17.909 6.733 .0003 
RESIDUAL 29 77.139 2.660 
---------------
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION 
---------------
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T p 
HPS -1.416 .834 -.245 -1.697 .1005 
GN -.623 .625 -.129 -.997 .3272 
RA -.582 .594 -.127 -.981 .3349 
AGE .029 .257 .015 .112 .9118 
MEANa 1.155 .203 .818 5.687 <. 0001 
(A) -.608 5.136 -.118 .9066 
aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than sore 
throat. 
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first and second steps of the regression analysis for 
headache enumeration scores are displayed in Tables 9 and 
10, respectively. 
Abbreviations used in the analyses. The regression 
tables contain abbreviations for almost all variable names 
in order to maximize use of the available page space. 
Only the age variable is listed without brevity. The 
\ 
dichotomous variables that describe subjects are: health 
professions student status (HPS), gender (GN), and racial 
affiliation (RA). The average of the enumeration scores 
for symptoms other than the one in the analysis is 
represented by the term "MEAN." Finally, the paren-
thetical expression "(A)" represents the intercept of the 
regression line. 
Variance explained~ demographic variables. The 
variance in enumeration scores that is attributable only 
to demographic characteristics is displayed in Tables 9, 
11, 13, 15, and 17. These tables contain the results of 
the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis for all of the five symptoms. 
The analysis of variance for regression for four of 
the five symptoms suggest that the demographic variables 
did not account for a significant proportion of the vari-
ance in enumeration. Only the analysis for the symptom of 
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watery eyes rendered an ! ratio that approached statis-
tical significance (see Table 11). Subjects who were 
enrolled in a health professions curriculum tended to 
think of a few more possible causes for this symptom. 
These results were also examined from the perspec-
tive of the information that is carried by the squared 
multiple regression coefficients. When the R2 's for all 
five symptoms were averaged, it was found that the 
demographic variables accounted for about 13% of the 
variance in enumeration. Although this appears appre-
ciable, it should be noted that the average adjusted R2 
(which eliminates the incidental inflation of R2 ) was 
reduced to 4%. This coincides with the analysis of 
variance for regression findings that are described above. 
Thus overall, the results suggest that the demographic 
variables did not account for any meaningful variance in 
enumeration. 
Variance explained ,ey other symptoms. The variance 
in the enumeration scores for one symptom that is 
attributable to both demographic variables and the 
enumeration scores of other symptoms is displayed in 
Tables 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18. These tables contain the 
results of the second step of the hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis for all of the five symptoms. 
78 
In the upper right hand corner of each table, the 
change in R2 from the first to the second step of the 
analysis is presented. The test of the statistical 
significance of the increase in explained variance between 
the steps is presented in the regression table as the 
t-test for the MEAN variable. 
This information is important because it describes 
the proportion of variance in the enumeration scores for 
one symptom that is uniquely attributable to the 
enumeration scores of the other symptoms. For example, 
Table 14 shows that adding the "MEAN" variable to the 
regression equation explained an additional 32% of the 
variance in enumeration scores for a congested nose. This 
is 32% of the variance that is explained after considering 
the variance that is attributable to demographic 
characteristics. 
To collectively examine the increase in explained 
variance for all of the five symptoms, the differences in 
adjusted R21 s for Tables 9 through 18 were computed 
(i.e., Step 2 - Step 1) and averaged. overall, it was 
found that 28% of the variance in the enumeration scores 
for any one symptom was uniquely attributable to the 
average of the enumeration scores for the other symptoms. 
Moreover, the increases in explained variance for all of 
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the five symptoms were statistically reliable beyond the 
.OS level of significance. These results indicate that 
the extent to which subjects could generate perceived 
causes for one symptom was related to their tendency to do 
so for other symptoms. 
Following each of the multiple regressions, a 
residuals analysis was conducted in order to examine the 
appropriateness of the linearity assumption. In each 
case, it was found that the scatterplot of the predicted 
and residual scores showed no discernible pattern. 
Moreover, normal probability plots indicated that the 
residuals possessed an underlying normal distribution. 
Given these findings, it was felt that the assumption of 
linearity was not violated. 
DISCUSSION FOR STUDY 1 
The task that was completed by the participants of 
Study 1 was simple, yet there are a number of conclusions 
that can be made about the naive diagnostician. Each of 
these is discussed below. 
MULTIPLE CAUSES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A SYMPTOM. 
One of the initial findings of Study 1 was that 
subjects were able to generate a number of perceived 
causes for each of the five symptoms. This is in line 
with Kelley's (1972, 1973) causal schema theory. 
Specifically, the results are consistent with the notion 
of multiple sufficient causes. When considering a 
particular symptom, subjects were able to think about a 
number of perceived causes -- each one of which would be 
sufficient to account for the symptom. 
In addition to this, it was found that some of the 
causes were mentioned by almost everyone, while others 
were mentioned by only a few. This finding could be 
explained in terms of Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, 1974) 
availability heuristic. It is possible that the perceived 
causes that were mentioned by most of the subjects were 
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those that were commonly and more easily called to mind. 
Thus, it seems that stress was an easily available cause 
for a headache, and a cold was an easily available cause 
for a congested nose. 
It would be interesting to see how another group of 
similar subjects would respond if they were given Tables 2 
through 6 and were asked to check the perceived causes 
that they thought could account for the respective 
symptoms. If it were found that most of the subjects 
checked most of the causes, it would lend support for the 
availability heuristic hypothesis. In other words, this 
would suggest that when individuals are not required to 
"think up" causes for a symptom, they are not influenced 
by the likelihood of certain causes coming to mind. 
When people actually diagnose themselves do they 
think about an array (i.e., a "laundry list") of potential 
causes for their symptom or do they focus upon a few major 
possibilities? In either case, do individuals think of 
the most available causes first or do they make an 
attribution that is aided by existing information such as 
situational cues? 
Although the present study cannot answer these 
questions directly, it seems reasonable to think that 
people do not typically embark upon a "laundry list" or 
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algorithmic type of strategy when making a symptom 
attribution. Such an approach would require considerable 
time and cognitive effort. Moreover, it should not be 
forgotten that the results of the Cameron and Leventhal 
(1988) study suggest that situational cues are important 
when ascribing causes to symptoms. If their findings are 
indicative of what happens in a larger context, there is 
some data that suggests that people do not use an 
algorithmic strategy when diagnosing their symptoms. 
Rather, it seems they are influenced to think about a 
cause that is related to situational (or other relevant) 
information. 
Clearly, there are no definitive statements that can 
be made about this matter at present. However, if 
situational cues are important for ascribing causes to 
symptoms, it would appear that the availability heuristic 
does not play a central role in self-diagnosis. It is 
reasonable to expect that the heuristic would influence 
peoples' attributions if they had to independently "come 
up with" a cause for a symptom. But if attributions are 
guided by cues, then individuals could well be stimulated 
into thinking about causes which, by themselves, might or 
might not be easily called to mind. 
If the availability heuristic was operating in Study 
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1, it might have been related to the experimental task. 
After all, subjects were asked to think about the causes 
for hypothetical symptoms, they were not actively engaged 
in the process of self-diagnosis. 
THE NAIVE DIAGNOSTICIAN THINKS OF GENERAL CAUSES. 
One of the findings from this study is that some of 
the perceived causes were associated with a majority of 
the symptoms. In some cases, these causes appear to be 
related to the cluster of symptoms that were presented. 
For example, it is easy to see why subjects reported that 
a cold and an allergy can be causes for a headache, sore 
throat, watery eyes, and a congested nose. In fact, this 
is indicative of what Bishop and Converse (1986) have 
termed illness prototypes. It is likely that this 
particular group of symptoms are prototypical of a cold or 
an allergy. It is odd, however, that subjects also 
reported that fatigue was a potential cause for the same 
symptoms. It is doubtful that a headache, sore throat, 
watery eyes, and a congested nose are prototypical of 
fatigue. 
There were four other perceived causes that were 
identified with three or four symptoms each; these were 
emotions (distress), alcohol/drugs, hot/cold weather, and 
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an illness. Although this finding is not well established 
at this point, it nonetheless suggests the interesting 
idea that the naive diagnostician thinks of general 
causes. In other words, there are some causes that can 
account for a variety of seemingly unrelated symptoms. If 
this is true, individuals would almost always be able to 
relate their symptom to some cause, even in the absence of 
contextual cues. General causes could help individuals 
"think of something" at those times when it is difficult 
to make a symptom attribution. 
The invocation of general causes can be seen in 
people who live near a toxic waste site. Once they 
realize that the air or water has been polluted there is a 
tendency to attribute a variety of symptoms to the 
presence of the noxious substance. In reality, this might 
be the cause of some symptoms, but the tendency is to 
attribute this cause to almost every symptom. 
The concept of general causes can provide insight 
into a collective behavior that is known as hysterical 
contagion or mass psychogenic illness. This refers to the 
spreading of a symptom to a group of individuals for which 
no physical explanation can be found (Colligan, Penne-
baker, & Murphy, 1982; Kerckhoff & Back, 1968; Skelton & 
Pennebaker, 1982). 
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In a book entitled The June Bug, Kerckhoff and Back 
(1968) describe a textile company that was forced to close 
when 40 out of 200 employees in a sewing room became ill, 
some of whom were hospitalized. The affected workers 
complained of symptoms such as dizziness, nausea, and 
profuse sweating. Ultimately, 62 out of a total of 965 
employees became ill. During this time there was a rumor 
in the factory indicating that these problems were being 
caused by invisible bugs that had arrived in a shipment of 
raw materials imported from South America. The authors 
found that individuals believed that the bugs were to 
blame for their symptoms, despite the fact that there was 
no confirming evidence. 
Following a complex analysis of this case, Kerckhoff 
and Back (1968) concluded that peoples' symptoms were 
caused by tension and job stress. From the workers per-
spective, however, it is possible that the "bugs" became a 
general cause, thus having the capability to account for 
most any symptom that was experienced. If the workers did 
not have the capacity to form general causes, the hys-
terical contagion might not have occurred. 
Although the experience with day-to-day symptoms is 
typically not this extreme, general causes can still play 
a significant role. For example, someone who is unable to 
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think of a reason for his or her headache can easily blame 
stress, the weather, or fatigue. These factors are 
pervasive in one's life and can be readily drawn upon to 
account for a variety of symptomatic experiences. The 
concept of general causes is an intriguing idea, one that 
is deserving of serious research and development. 
INDIVIDUALS THINK OF INNOCUOUS OR MANAGEABLE CAUSES FOR 
SYMPTOMS. 
The results of Study 1 have shown that subjects 
tended to make attributions that were harmless (e.g., a 
cold) or manageable by a lay person given some degree of 
effort (e.g., hot/cold weather). In all, perceived causes 
were found to be predominately internal, controllable, and 
unstable in nature. 
There are three explanations for this finding. 
First, it should not be forgotten that the subjects in 
this study are young and relatively healthy. Many of 
their symptoms have actually been caused by harmless and 
manageable influences. Because the five symptoms of Study 
1 are typical of those experienced by college students, it 
is possible that subjects thought of the causes that are 
typical of their experience. 
In a related way, subjects might have thought of 
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simplistic types of causes because they were asked to 
respond to simplistic types of symptoms. Perhaps 
responses would have been different if the symptoms were 
of greater intensity, such as a severe headache or a 
piercing abdominal pain. If so, it would suggest that 
self-diagnosis is, in part, a function of symptom 
severity. 
The fact that subjects identified innocuous and 
manageable causes might also be explained in terms of a 
motivational bias. It is possible that when making a 
symptom attribution there is an automatic tendency to 
think of simple, non-threatening types of causes. In this 
way, individuals protect themselves from personal threat. 
This idea is consistent with other investigators who have 
argued that people exhibit a tendency to discount the 
importance or seriousness of their symptomatic experiences 
(e.g., see Ditto et al., 1988; Green et al., 1974). 
SYMPTOM ENUMERATION IS RELATED TO SYMPTOM TYPE. 
Analyses from Study 1 showed that enumeration scores 
varied as a function of symptom type. The fact that 
individuals can think of more causes for some symptoms and 
less for others might be related to their experience. It 
was noted earlier that some symptoms are more commonly 
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experienced and are more frequently the focus of media 
attention. Other symptoms are less frequently experienced 
and discussed. 
It is interesting, however, to consider how 
enumeration influences the information processing aspects 
of making a symptom attribution. For example, if self-
diagnoses are made independently of situational cues, it 
seems likely that the time it would take to make an 
attribution as well as the confidence that one would have 
in that attribution is a function of enumeration. In 
other words, it would take longer to make a symptom 
attribution if there were many perceived causes to con-
sider. Likewise, someone probably would be less sure of 
his or her attribution because there is a variety of 
causes that can explain the symptom. 
If, however, cues guide the selection of causes, it 
is possible that enumeration plays a small role in the 
process of choosing a cause. This is because situational 
cues (or other relevant information) would provide the 
individual with a guess or a hunch about the cause that is 
at work. Hence, it would make no difference if there were 
few or many causes to explain a symptom -- the cue would 
implicate some particular cause. 
SYMPTOM ENUMERATION MIGHT BE AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE 
VARIABLE. 
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It was interesting to find that the enumeration 
score for each symptom was positively and reliably 
correlated with the average of the enumeration scores of 
the other symptoms. One interpretation of this finding is 
that enumeration is an individual difference variable. 
This would suggest that some people have the tendency to 
think of more causes for symptoms while others tend to 
think of less. For lack of a better label, these indi-
viduals can be said to be high and low on the construct of 
symptom enumeration. 
As an individual difference variable, symptom 
enumeration could affect self-diagnosis in two distinct 
ways. First, it might influence one's tendency to make a 
symptom attribution. In other words, high enumerators 
might be prone to self-diagnose, even when a symptom is 
minor and fleeting. And low enumerators might not think 
of a cause for a symptom, despite the fact that it might 
last for a considerable period of time. Second, enumer-
ation could influence one's ability to make a symptom 
reattribution. When confronted with the fact that one's 
symptom attribution might be incorrect, high enumerators 
would be better equipped to bring some other cause to mind 
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so that another attribution can be made. 
Conclusion 
In summary, then, it can be seen that Study 1 has 
provided an array of interesting results, some of which 
have nurtured the discussion of general causes and symptom 
enumeration as an individual difference variable. More 
importantly, the study has raised just as many questions 
as it has answered. From this work it is clear that 
future research needs to examine the role of situational 
cues, the influence of the availability heuristic, 
motivational biases and much more. To do this, however, 
investigators will need to study people as they make 
attributions for real symptoms. This is the focus of 
Study 2. 
METHOD FOR STUDY 2 
subjects 
The subjects for this study were 105 introductory 
psychology students who received course credit for their 
participation. An additional 10 subjects were recruited 
from other psychology courses by means of a flier that 
asked for volunteers. 
The demographic characteristics of all individuals 
are displayed in Table 19. Similar to Study 1, subjects 
were predominately female, Caucasian, freshmen who were 
enrolled in non-health oriented curricula. There were 
seven individuals who were trained health professionals 
(all were nurses). The mean age of subjects was 19.66 
years (SD• 2.76). 
Overall, the subjects from Studies 1 and 2 were 
quite similar. A comparison of characteristics showed 
that there were no reliable differences in the relative 
distributions of gender, x2 (1, ~= 148)= 2.17, £= .141; 
racial background, ! 2 (1, ~-148)= 1.22, £• .269; student 
2 
rank, ! (2, ~= 148)= 4.61, £= .10; and trained health 
professionals ! 2 (1, ~- 148)• 2.97, E•.085. However, the 
subjects in Study 2 were slightly older (19.66 vs. 18.46), 
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Table 19 
Demographic Characteristics of the Subjects in Study ~ 
-------------------------------------------------------
characteristic 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Racial Affiliation 
Caucasian 
Black 
Hispanic 
Oriental / Asian 
Other 
student Rank 
Freshman 
Sophomore 
Junior 
Senior 
Other 
Frequencya 
48 
65 
85 
10 
9 
8 
1 
66 
29 
5 
3 
10 
Relative 
Frequency 
.43 
.57 
.75 
.09 
.08 
.27 
.01 
.59 
.26 
.04 
.03 
.08 
(table continues) 
Characteristic 
Curriculum 
Health Professions 
Other 
Health Professional 
Yes 
No 
Frequency 
7 
106 
9 
104 
Relative 
Frequency 
.06 
.94 
.08 
.92 
Note: The data from two subjects are missing. 
aN•ll3. 
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!(146)= 2.50, E< .02. They also had a smaller percentage 
of individuals (6% vs. 17%) who were enrolled in a health 
professions curriculum, ~2 (1, N• 148)- 4.00, E< .05. 
Instruments 
The subjects of Study 2 were interviewed with the 
Symptom Attribution Survey (see Appendix B). This 
instrument was developed for use in the present study and 
was designed to document a sampling of the cognitions, 
perceptions, and behaviors of individuals who have thought 
about the causes for a recent physical symptom. A handout 
that was used with the survey is located in Appendix C. 
Subjects were also required to complete the Health 
Opinion Survey (Krantz, Baum, & Wideman, 1980), the 
Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic Languidness (known as the 
PILL) (Pennebaker, 1982), and the Body Consciousness 
Questionnaire (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981). These are 
paper and pencil instruments that assess individual 
differences on: (1) the preference for information and 
behavioral involvement in health care, (2) the tendency to 
experience symptoms, and (3) the public and private 
aspects of body awareness, respectively. Copies of these 
instruments are in Appendices D, E, and F. 
These paper and pencil instruments were chosen for 
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this study because they assess health related individual 
differences that could reasonably influence symptom 
attribution processes. In addition, the instruments were 
normed on college students and are designed to address 
routine aspects of health and symptomatology. This was 
considered most appropriate for the subjects in this 
study. 
Symptom attribution survey. At the beginning of 
this interview, respondents were asked a few questions 
about the nature of their symptomatic experience. For 
example, they were asked to identify their symptom and 
describe how uncomfortable it was, how long it lasted, and 
how serious it appeared to be. After this, the 
respondents were asked to list all of the possible causes 
that could account for a symptom like the one they had 
experienced. 
At that point, subjects were asked to identify the 
first cause that came to mind when they experienced their 
symptom. They were then asked questions regarding 
information that was acquired from the qualities of the 
symptom, the outcomes of self-treatment, the interactions 
with friends or other lay consultants, visits with health 
professionals, and medical guides. Respondents were asked 
to freely describe what it was that led them to think 
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about their attribution. They were also asked to freely 
describe anything that might have informed them that their 
attribution was wrong. Some of these questions are 
discussed in more detail later. 
If the respondent mentioned that he or she thought 
about more than one cause during the course of the 
symptom, the same set of questions was repeated. The 
interview was designed to ask these questions for up to 
three perceived causes (i.e., an initial attribution and 
two reattributions). Only the number and type of 
attributions were recorded after that point. Many of the 
analyses for Study 2 were conducted as a function of the 
three attributions. For the remainder of this work, these 
are referred to as the primary, secondary, and tertiary 
attributions. 
Health Opinion Survey. This survey is a 16 item 
instrument that asks respondents to agree or disagree with 
a series of statements that address the desire for health 
related information and the interest in being involved 
with one's own health care. From this, two subscale 
scores are generated. Krantz et al. (1980) have reported 
that the behavior and information subscales have internal 
consistency measures of .74 and .76, respectively. In 
addition, test-retest reliabilities over a seven week 
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period have been measured at .71 and .59, respectively. 
Both the subscale and total scores from the Health 
Opinion Survey have demonstrated low to moderate corre-
lations (average r• .27) with the Health Locus of Control 
Scale (cf. Wallston & Wallston, 1982; Wallston, Wallston, 
Kaplan, & Maides, 1976), and a very low correlation 
(average r• .08) with social desirability (cf. Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1964). More importantly, Krantz et al. (1980) 
have shown that college students who scored high on the 
behavior subscale showed a greater tendency to make a 
self-diagnosis in response to a recent physical symptom. 
Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic Languidness. The PILL 
is a 54 item instrument that presents the respondent with 
a wide variety of common symptoms. Each symptom is rated 
on a 5-point time continuum that measures the frequency 
with which the symptom is experienced. One score is 
generated from this instrument. Pennebaker (1982) has 
reported that the internal consistency of the PILL is .88, 
and that the test-retest reliability across a two month 
period is .79. Unlike other medical checklists, such as 
the Cornell Medical Index, the PILL focuses upon common 
symptoms. 
Body Consciousness Questionnaire. This instrument 
contains 15 statements that reflect the perceptions of 
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one's body. The task of the respondent is to rate each 
statement in terms of how characteristic it is of his or 
her own perception. The instrument renders three subscale 
scores; these are private body consciousness (i.e., the 
awareness of internal sensations), public body conscious-
ness (i.e., concern about the outward appearance of one's 
body), and body competence (i.e., the belief in the 
adequacy of one's body). 
Miller et al. (1981) have reported that the 
test-retest reliabilities for the three subscales, in 
order, are .69, .73, and .83 over a two month period. 
Moreover, the authors have noted that private body 
consciousness correlated more strongly with private 
self-consciousness than it did with public self-
consciousness. The reverse of this was found with public 
body consciousness (cf. Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 
1975). 
Procedure 
Subjects were invited to volunteer for Study 2 if 
they had experienced a physical symptom sometime in the 
previous three to four weeks. They were asked not to 
volunteer if they had participated in Study 1. On their 
initial contact with the investigator, each subject was 
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asked to complete a demographic information sheet. 
Following this, the investigator read the introduction of 
the Symptom Attribution Survey, and then conducted the 
interview with the subject. 9 Before departing, subjects 
were informed that they would be receiving a few question-
naires in the mail. All were informed that full credit 
for participation in the study was contingent upon 
returning the questionnaires in the post-paid return 
envelopes. 
Approximately three to five days after the inter-
view, the investigator mailed the self-report instruments. 
In a cover letter, subjects were informed that everything 
should be returned within five days and that the forms 
should be completed in the order that they were received. 
This was important because the instruments were put in 
random order to control for presentation effects. 
The time interval between tasks was implemented to 
minimize fatigue (the interview averaged 32.8 minutes), 
and subject reactivity. During pilot interviews it was 
noted that some respondents had been concerned about their 
causal analysis. For example, some people prefaced their 
answers with qualifiers such as "I know this won't seem 
very scientific, but ... " It was felt that if the survey 
created a reactivity, some subjects might want to appear 
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more rational on the self-report instruments, thus biasing 
the results. 
Counterbalancing the tasks between subjects would 
have been a desirable method for controlling the effects 
of task presentation (cf. Underwood, 1966). In this case, 
half of the subjects would complete the interview followed 
by the self-report instruments, while the other half would 
do this in reverse order. This, however, would require 
half of the subjects to postpone the symptom interview. 
It was felt that Study 2 was already relying enough upon 
subjects' recollections of a common event. To delay the 
interview would probably make recall more difficult and 
prone to additional error. 10 
Research Questions and Data Analysis 
There were nine main questions that guided the data 
analysis for Study 2. These questions are listed below 
with the procedures that were used to answer them. 
Question 1: WHAT TYPES OF SYMPTOMS DID SUBJECTS 
EXPERIENCE? 
To answer this question, verbal reports of symptoms 
were categorized and tallied. These categories were then 
organized into higher "systems-oriented" classes. This 
was done to provide greater structure in reporting the 
variety of symptoms that was experienced. 
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Question 2: HOW MANY SUBJECTS MADE A SYMPTOM ATTRIBUTION, 
AND WHAT TYPES OF ATTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE? 
Making an attribution. Attribution researchers such 
as Hastie (1974), Lau and Russel (1980), Pyzczynski and 
Greenberg (1981), and Wong and Weiner (1981} have shown 
how attributional processes are triggered by unexpected 
events. Physical symptoms can be viewed as unexpected in 
that they sometimes occur suddenly, and almost always 
disrupt the way one feels or performs routine activities. 
In this sense, it would be expected that most individuals 
make an attribution in response to a symptom. 
The number of subjects who made no symptom attri-
bution and those who made at least one attribution were 
tallied and compared with a one-way chi-square test. It 
was expected that most of the subjects made at least one 
attribution for their symptom. 
Types of attributions. Using definitions from Study 
1, subjects' primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions 
were classified with the dimensions of locus, stability, 
and controllability. The occurrences of the levels of 
these dimensions were then tallied and compared with 
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one-way chi-square tests. 
When presented with hypothetical, innocuous types of 
symptoms, the subjects in Study 1 identified causes that 
were primarily internal, unstable and controllable. If 
individuals apply the same attribution processes with real 
symptoms, it would be expected that similar results would 
be found with Study 2. 
Question 3: WHAT EXPLAINS THE VARIANCE IN ATTRIBUTIONAL 
EFFORT? 
In this study, attributional effort was concep-
tualized as the degree to which someone tried to diagnose 
his or her symptom. This was operationally defined as the 
number of attributions that were made. 
The importance of question 3 is based in the fact 
that many of the analyses for Study 2 were designed to 
examine cognitions or behaviors as they occurred from the 
primary to the tertiary attribution. It was thought that 
attributional effort might be related to factors such as 
the type or quality of one's symptom or health related 
individual differences. For example, subjects with a 
minor symptom might not need to go beyond a primary 
attribution, while those with a more serious or uncom-
fortable one might be led to make secondary and tertiary 
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attributions. Likewise, individuals who score high on the 
construct of private body consciousness might be inclined 
to make more attributions than those who score low. It 
would be important to be aware of these factors so that 
they could be used in the interpretation of other 
analyses. 
To explain the variance in attributional effort, a 
hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
conducted. The analysis was organized into four steps. 
On step 1, eight dummy coded variables representing 
symptom type were entered into the equation. On step 2, 
five variables that depict symptom characteristics were 
entered. These were: duration of the symptom, perceived 
discomfort, perceived seriousness, and two dichotomous 
variables that measured whether or not the symptom was 
previously experienced by the subject and whether or not 
it interfered with routine activities. On step 3, a 
single dichotomous variable was entered. This was called 
attributional response, and represented the time at which 
one's initial attribution was made (i.e., at the time the 
symptom appeared or some time later). On Step 4, health-
related individual difference variables were entered. 
These were: private body consciousness, the information 
and behavior subscales of the Health Opinion Survey, and 
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the PILL. A symptom enumeration score was also entered on 
this step. 11 
Attributional response was selected because it was 
viewed as a proxy measure of the need to self-diagnose, 
that is, the need to know the cause of one's symptom. 
The selection of this variable was not based upon prior 
research. Rather, it was a reasonable assumption that if 
the need to self-diagnose were high, one would begin 
attributional reasoning at the time of symptom onset. If 
the need were low, one might not be concerned about an 
attribution until later. Given this, it seemed reasonable 
to expect that attributional response would be positively 
related to attributional effort. 
Question 4: WHAT TYPES OF INFORMATION DID SUBJECTS USE 
FOR MAKING A SYMPTOM ATTRIBUTION? 
During the interview, subjects were asked to 
describe the type or types of information that helped them 
make a symptom attribution. Responses to this open-ended 
question were examined, classified and tallied for the 
primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions. In order 
to test the adequacy of the classification scheme, the 
responses for the primary attribution were independently 
coded by two raters. Agreement was assessed with the 
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kappa statistic (Fleiss, 1973). 
Cues from the environment and from one's memory were 
discussed earlier in terms of their expected value for 
making symptom attributions. In addition, the Cameron and 
Leventhal (1988) study has provided empirical support for 
the influence of environment cues. Hence, it is expected 
that subjects' responses to the open ended question would 
reflect the importance of environment and memory cues if 
they are useful in ascribing causes to symptoms. 
Question 5: DID THE OUTCOMES OF SELF-TREATMENT INFLUENCE 
SUBJECTS' BELIEF IN THEIR ATTRIBUTION, AND 
DID THIS AFFECT THE TENDENCY TO MAKE A 
REATTRIBUTION? 
Belief in one's attribution. If subjects made an 
attempt at relieving their symptom, they were asked if the 
outcome of that action influenced the belief in their 
attribution. Those respondents who said that their belief 
was either strengthened or weakened were asked to explain 
why they felt this had occurred. Responses to this 
question were examined, classified and tallied for the 
primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions. The 
adequacy of the classification scheme was tested by having 
two independent raters code the responses for the primary 
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attribution. Agreement was then assessed with the kappa 
statistic. 
Making a reattribution. Theories of self-regulation 
(e.g., see Leventhal & Hirschman, 1982; Leventhal, Nerenz, 
& Strauss, 1980) show how health-related beliefs are 
influenced by the outcomes of actions. For example, 
someone may take a antacid to relieve what is believed to 
be a case of heartburn, only to find that the discomfort 
gets worse. As a result, the feedback from this action 
might lead the individual to re-evaluate his or her 
symptom attribution. This type of feedback is similar to 
the notion of expectancy/outcome incongruity which was 
discussed in terms of its ability to promote attributional 
processing. Given this, it was felt that individuals 
would be more inclined to make a symptom reattribution if 
the belief in their original attribution was weakened 
following self-treatment outcomes. The reverse would be 
expected if belief in one's original attribution was 
strengthened. 
To examine this hypothesis, the impact of self-
treatment outcomes (i.e., the belief that one's 
attribution was strengthened, weakened, or unaffected) was 
cross-referenced with subsequent attribution activity 
(i.e., the subject either made or did not make a subse-
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quent attribution). The data were then analyzed with a 
chi-square test for association. 
Question 6: DID SUBJECTS SEE THEMSELVES AS BEING SICK, 
AND DID THIS INFLUENCE THE TENDENCY TO MAKE 
A REATTRIBUTION? 
The perception of being sick. The importance of 
question 6 lies in the phenomenological interpretation of 
the term "sick." Although this topic has received little 
attention in the psychological literature, Baumann (1961) 
has shown that individuals define sickness using feeling, 
symptomalogical, and performance dimensions. In other 
words, people report that being sick means that one does 
not feel right, one has symptoms, and one is unable to 
carry on his or her normal activities. 12 Thus, it would 
appear that being sick means that one is affected by a 
dispositional type of condition. A condition that is 
somewhat more than an external, fleeting influence. 
Given this, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
perception of being sick is susceptible to the fundamental 
attribution error (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). In other 
words, there might be an automatic assumption that one's 
symptoms are not indicative of an underlying illness. If 
this is true, individuals should typically believe that 
they are not sick -- at least until they exhibit the 
qualities mentioned above. 
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Research by Campbell (1975b) supports this notion. 
In his study, a sample of mothers and their children were 
given a list of 13 symptoms and were asked if these would 
be indicators of illness in the mother. They were then 
asked if the same symptoms would be indicators of illness 
in the child. In result, it was found that mothers were 
more likely to attribute illness to their children, and 
children were more likely to attribute illness to their 
mothers. 
To answer the first part of question 6, the number 
of subjects who believed that they were sick and those who 
believed that they were not sick were tallied and compared 
with one-way chi-square tests. This was done for the 
primary, secondary and tertiary attributions. Overall, it 
was expected that most people would see themselves as not 
being sick. 
Making a reattribution. If the perception of being 
sick means that one believes him- or herself to be 
affected by something other than an external, fleeting 
condition, it is reasonable to assume that there will be a 
resistance to change a symptom attribution. To test this 
idea, the belief in being (or not being) sick was cross-
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referenced with subsequent attribution activity. The data 
were then analyzed with a chi-square test for association. 
It was expected that those who perceived themselves as 
being sick would be less inclined to make a reattribution. 
Question 7: DID DISCUSSIONS WITH FRIENDS OR OTHER LAY 
CONSULTANTS INFLUENCE SUBJECTS' BELIEF IN 
THEIR ATTRIBUTION, AND DID THIS AFFECT THE 
TENDENCY TO MAKE A REATTRIBUTION? 
Discussing symptoms with ~ consultants. Medical 
sociologists have been aware of "lay referral structures" 
(Friedson, 1961) or "lay conferral systems" (Elder, 1968) 
for nearly three decades. These have been described as 
the informal network of friends and acquaintances who 
provide medically relevant information to each other. 
Research findings suggest that a substantial proportion of 
individuals make use of lay consultants when faced with 
symptoms. For example, Suchman (1965), Miller (1973) and 
Sanders (1982) found that medically uninformed individuals 
were sought by 74%, 62%, and 81% of their samples, respec-
tively. The work by Sanders is particularly relevant here 
because it is based upon a group of college 
undergraduates. 
The impetus for lay conferral is thought to be based 
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in social comparison processes (Sanders, 1982). Thus, it 
would be expected that the greater one's uncertainty in 
the interpretation of a symptom (such as when it is 
unusually intense or uncomfortable), the greater his or 
her tendency will be to seek lay consultation. Moreover, 
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954; West & Wick-
lund, 1980) predicts that individuals will seek people who 
are most like themselves. 
During the interview of Study 2, subjects were asked 
if they had discussed their symptoms with a friend or 
other lay consultant. 13 If so, respondents were asked to 
identify this person. In addition, they were asked if 
they specifically intended to discuss the symptom, and if 
the lay consultant made an attribution for their symptom 
during the discussion. If the lay consultant made a 
similar attribution, the subject was asked if this made 
him or her feel more confident about the attribution. If 
the lay consultant made a contrary attribution, the sub-
ject was asked if this made him or her feel less confident 
about the attribution. 
If the lay consultant did not make an attribution 
during the discussion, the subject was asked if there was 
anything said that in some way made him or her feel more 
or less confident about the attribution. Open ended 
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responses were recorded for this last question. 
Subjects' responses to each of the above questions 
were tallied and compared with one-way chi-square tests. 
This was done for the primary, secondary, and tertiary 
attributions. In addition, the open ended responses were 
examined, classified and tallied. The adequacy of the 
classification scheme was tested by having two independent 
raters code the responses for the primary attribution. 
Agreement was then assessed with the kappa statistic. 
In order to examine a motive for seeking lay 
consultation, subjects' rating of perceived discomfort and 
seriousness were correlated with the intent to discuss 
their symptom (l• intended to discuss symptom, o- did not 
intend to discuss symptom). 
Given the subjects in this study it was expected 
that most would have discussed their symptom with one or 
two friends. Although it was difficult to predict if 
people intended to discuss their symptom, it was hypothe-
sized that subjects' confidence in their attribution would 
would be higher if the lay consultant made a similar 
symptom attribution. Based upon social comparison theory 
it was also hypothesized that the ratings of discomfort 
and seriousness would correlate positively with the intent 
to discuss one's symptom. 
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Making ~ reattribution. To date, the literature 
on the influence of lay referral is not consistent. For 
example, Sanders (1982) describes the value of lay 
consultation for making decisions about the meaning of 
symptoms. In addition, he found that college under-
graduates reported that the advice of a lay consultant 
typically has a strong directive influence on reactions to 
symptoms. The work by Miller (1973), however, found that 
individuals showed equal tendencies to accept and to 
reject lay advice regarding actions for cancer symptoms of 
the head and neck. 
To investigate the influence of lay referral on 
reattribution, the strength of subjects' belief in their 
attribution following the discussion with a friend (i.e., 
the belief was strengthened, weakened, or unaffected) was 
cross-referenced with subsequent attribution activity. 
The data were then analyzed with a chi-square test for 
association. If the belief in one's initial attribution 
was weakened by the discussion, it would be expected that 
individuals would tend to make a reattribution. The 
reverse would be expected if one's belief was 
strengthened. 
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Question 8: DID SUBJECTS RELY UPON HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
OR MEDICAL GUIDES TO HELP THEM MAKE A SYMPTOM 
ATTRIBUTION? 14 
Not much is known about the health care seeking 
behavior of college undergraduates; however, there are 
some data to suggest that they are not high consumers of 
health care practice. It was noted earlier that the 
National Center for Health Statistics (1981) reported that 
there were about 18.3 million office visits during 1977-78 
for the primary complaint of headache. Of that total, 
only 2.5 million visits (13.6%) were made by individuals 
15-24 years of age. 15 The only age group that showed a 
lower percentage of office visits was that under 15 years 
old. In a similar vein, Sanders' (1982) survey of under-
graduates found that a health care professional was sought 
to explain symptoms about once every 14 months. Given 
this, it was reasonable to expect that most of the 
subjects in Study 2 did not seek a health professional to 
aid in the diagnosis of their symptom. Likewise, it was 
expected that most did not refer to a medical guide. 
To answer question 8, the number of individuals who 
sought professional help for their symptom and those who 
did not were tallied and compared with a one-way chi-
square test. The same was done for those who referred to 
a medical guide and those who did not. Both sets of 
analyses were conducted for the primary, secondary and 
tertiary attributions. 
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Question 9: WHAT TYPES OF INFORMATION DID SUBJECTS 
ENCOUNTER THAT CAST DOUBT UPON THEIR SYMPTOM 
ATTRIBUTION, AND DID THIS AFFECT THE TENDENCY 
TO MAKE A REATTRIBUTION? 
Types of doubt provoking information. During the 
interview, subjects were asked if there was any informa-
tion that made them think that their attribution might be 
wrong. If so, they were asked to describe what this was. 
An open ended response was desired so that the survey 
could assess facts that had not already been covered. 
These responses were examined, classified and tallied for 
the. primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions. In 
order to test the adequacy of the classification scheme, 
the responses for the primary attribution were inde-
pendently coded by two raters. Agreement was then 
assessed with the kappa statistic. 
Persuasion and expectancy/outcome incongruity were 
discussed earlier in terms of their potential influence 
for stimulating a symptom reattribution. Hence, it was 
expected that subjects' open ended responses would reflect 
these influences if they are important for making a 
reattribution. 
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Making ! reattribution. It was expected that the 
presence of doubt provoking information would stimulate a 
reattribution. In other words, people should be prone to 
make a reattribution if they perceive information that 
makes them think that their initial attribution might be 
wrong. To test this hypothesis, the belief that doubt 
provoking information was present or absent was cross-
referenced with subsequent attribution activity. These 
data were then analyzed with a chi-square test for 
association. 
RESULTS FOR STUDY 2 
Symptoms Experienced ~ Subjects (Question !l 
The types of symptoms that were experienced by 
subjects are presented in Table 20. As it can be seen, 
many of the individuals (66%) had an experience with a 
headache or a variety of gastrointestinal problems. 
Across all symptoms, however, subjects reported a wide 
range of discomfort and perceived seriousness. The 
discomfort ratings ranged from 3 to 10 (~- 6.97, SD• 
1.65), where the values of 1 and 10 indicate "very little 
discomfort" and "a lot of discomfort," respectively. 
Similarly, the seriousness ratings ranged from 1 to 10 (M• 
4.43, SD• 2.31), where these indicate that one's symptom 
was perceived to be "not very serious" and "very serious," 
respectively. In terms of duration, the shortest symptom 
lasted about one hour, while the longest lasted 22 weeks 
16 (M• 1.52 weeks, SD• 3.26 weeks MD• 2.65 days). Almost 
all of the subjects (85%) said that their symptom inter-
fered with routine activities to some extent. 
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Table 20 
symptoms Experienced ~ the Subjects in Study ± 
Symptom Type 
Headache 
(alone or with other 
symptoms) 
Gastrointestinal 
(stomach ache, nausea, 
diarrhea, upset stomach 
with and without other 
symptoms, multiple 
gastrointestinal symptoms) 
Musculoskeletal 
(muscle aches, sore back, 
joint pain) 
Frequencya 
51 
25 
10 
Relative 
Frequency 
.44 
.22 
.09 
(table continues) 
symptom Type Frequency 
Upper Respiratory 
(Sore throat, cough, multiple 
upper respiratory symptoms) 
Genitourinary 
(urinary frequency, burning) 
Ear Problems 
(burning, trauma) 
Skin Rash 
Other Singular Symptoms 
Other Multiple Symptoms 
a N• 115. 
7 
4 
3 
2 
8 
5 
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Relative 
Frequency 
.06 
.04 
.03 
.02 
.07 
.04 
Attributional Activity and Types of Attributions Made 
(Question ~ 
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Making an attribution. Of the 115 subjects in this 
study, 112 made at least one attribution for their 
2 
symptom, ~ (1, N= 115)• 103.31, £< .00005. The mean 
number of attributions was 2.09 (SD• 1.26), and 63% of the 
subjects made two or more. 
Types of attributions. Tables 21, 22, and 23 
display the frequency distributions of the dimensions of 
locus, stability, and controllability for the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary attributions. The data show that 
subjects reported causes that were predominately internal, 
unstable, and controllable. When averaged across the 
three tables, the ratios of internal:external, unstable: 
stable, and controllable:uncontrollable perceived causes 
we~e found to be 2.08:1, 5.64:1, and 1.77:1, respectively. 
These ratios were re-computed for the 33 subjects 
who made all three attributions. This was done to insure 
that the findings in Tables 21-23 were not due to the 
attrition of subjects (note how N drops from 112 to 72 to 
33). When averaged across all three attributions, the 
ratios were, in order, 2.48:1, 5.05:1, and 1.75:1. The 
levels of statistical significance were very similar to 
those in Tables 21-23. 
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Table 21 
Frequency Distributions for the Dimensions of Locus, 
stability, and Controllability for Primary Attri-
butions 
Dimension 
LOCUS 
Internal 
External 
Stability 
Stable 
Unstable 
Controllability 
Controllable 
Uncontrollable 
Frequency 
76 
36 
12 
100 
75 
37 
Relative 
Frequency 
.68 
.32 
.11 
.89 
.67 
.33 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1, N• 112. 
Chi-Square 
Value 
14.29 <. 0005 
69.14 <.0005 
12.89 <. 0005 
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Table 22 
Frequency Distributions for the Dimensions of Locus, 
stability, and Controllability for Secondary Attri-
butions 
Dimension 
LOCUS 
Internal 
External 
Stability 
Stable 
unstable 
Controllability 
Controllable 
Uncontrollable 
Frequency 
47 
25 
10 
62 
46 
26 
Relative 
Frequency 
.65 
.35 
.14 
.86 
.64 
.36 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1, N• 72. 
Chi-Square 
value 
6.72 .01 
37.56 <.0005 
5.56 .02 
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Table 23 
Frequency Distributions for the Dimensions of Locus, 
Stability, and Controllability for Tertiary Attri-
butions 
Dimension 
LOCUS 
Internal 
External 
Stability 
Stable 
unstable 
Controllability 
Controllable 
Uncontrollable 
Frequency 
23 
10 
10 
23 
18 
15 
Relative 
Frequency 
.70 
.30 
.30 
.70 
.55 
.45 
Note: For each analysis, df= 1, N• 33. 
Chi-Square 
Value 
5.12 
5.12 
0.27 
.02 
.02 
.60 
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In addition to the above analyses, there was an 
interest in seeing if the actual attributions (i.e., the 
labels) that were made for real symptoms were similar to 
that made for the hypothetical symptoms presented in Study 
1. Given the nature of subjects' experience, the only 
symptoms that could be used for this purpose were a 
headache, upset stomach and sore throat. 17 
Of the 51 people who reported a headache as their 
primary symptom, 10 said that they had additional 
symptoms. Therefore, the remaining 41 were chosen for 
this analysis. The results showed that 90% of the primary 
attributions for a real headache fell into one of the 
categories of Table 2. The two most frequently reported 
attributions were stress (N• 15) and fatigue (N• 7). 
Ninety-six percent and 100% of the secondary and tertiary 
attributions, respectively, also fell into the categories 
of Table 2. Stress and fatigue were again the two most 
frequently reported causes for the secondary attribution 
(Ns= 8 and 4, respectively). Only 10 people made a 
tertiary attribution, and no one attribution category 
appeared to be mentioned over another. 
Seven students experienced an upset stomach. In 
each case, he or she made a primary and secondary 
attribution that could be classified with the categories 
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in Table 5. Only one of the five tertiary attributions 
could not be classified with these categories. It was 
interesting to see that each of the classified attri-
butions fell within the first eight categories listed in 
Table 5. These were the categories that were mentioned 
with higher frequency by the subjects of Study 1. 
Only four students experienced a sore throat. In 
each case, his or her primary, secondary and tertiary 
attribution could be classified within the first seven 
categories of Table 6. 
Overall, the above results are consistent with the 
findings of Study 1. This suggests that young adults 
display the tendency to think of innocuous or manageable 
types of causes for symptoms, both imagined and real. 
Attributional Effort (Question l.l 
A summary of the multiple regression analysis is 
displayed in Table 24. The eight dummy variables 
representing symptom type accounted for an adjusted 4% of 
the variance in attributional effort, but the analysis of 
variance for regression did not reach statistical 
significance. Symptom characteristics accounted for an 
additional 14% of the variance, but symptom duration was 
the only variable with a significant regression weight 
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Table 24 
summary for the Regression of Attributional Effort on 
Symptom, Behavioral, and Individual Difference Variables 
variables in the Equation 
Step 1 
Symptom Type 
(8 Variables) 
Step 2 
Symptom Characteristics 
(5 variables) 
Step 3 
Attributional Response 
(1 variable) 
Step 4 
Adjusted 
R2 
Individual Difference Measures .21£ 
(5 variables) 
Change in 
Adjusted R2 
.oo9 
--------------------------------------------------------
a 1. 49' .1 7. b 2.80, .0021. !'_(8,98)- .E· !'_(13,93)• _E• 
c !'_(5,93)• 4.45, 
_E• . 0011. d !'_(14,92)= 3.06, .E- .0007. 
e !'_(1,92)= 4.95, _E= .03. f !'_(19,87)= 2.51, _E= .002. 
9!'_(5,87)< 1.00, 
.E- .4333 . 
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(partial~= .42, !(93)= 4.46, E< .00005). Attributional 
response explained an additional 3% of the variance and 
was also statistically significant (partial~= .23, !(92)= 
2.22, E• .0286). The individual difference variables 
explained none of the remaining variance. 
A residuals analysis was conducted in order to 
examine the appropriateness of the linearity assumption. 
It was found that the scatterplot of the predicted and 
residual scores showed no discernible pattern. In 
addition, a normal probability plot indicated that the 
residuals possessed an underlying normal distribution. 
Given these findings, it was felt that the assumption of 
linearity was not violated. 
It appears that the number of attributions that were 
made by subjects can be accounted for by the duration of 
the symptom and how quickly one began to think about those 
attributions. Specifically, individuals who had longer 
lasting symptoms and those who made their initial 
attribution at the time the symptom appeared tended to 
make more attributions. 
Attributional Cues (Question !l 
When subjects were asked to describe the information 
that led them to make an attribution for their symptom, 
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seven themes or categories emerged (see Table 25). A 
description of these, with an exemplary quote, is given 
briefly below. 
Neglected action. The idea of a cause came to mind 
when the subject remembered that he or she neglected to do 
something that would prevent the development of a symptom 
(e.g., "I knew I wasn't dressed properly for the weath-
er"). 
Past experience - pairing of symptom with cause. 
The subject thought of a cause from past experience -- or 
he/she had been pairing the symptom and cause in recent 
past experience (e.g., "I had these symptoms last year and 
the doctor diagnosed it as walking pneumonia. When I had 
these symptoms again, I just knew what it was. I didn't 
have to think about it. I just intuitively knew what the 
cause was. The thought of a virus was spontaneous."). 
Event / activity. The subject inferred a cause for 
his or her symptom from an event that had taken place or 
was taking place at the time of the symptom (e.g., "I was 
waiting for my flight and it was canceled. After that, 
everybody was scrambling to book another flight. I just 
got a bad headache then."). 
Contagion. The subject thought he or she was 
infected by someone who had a contagious condition or was 
Table 25 
sources of Information that Subjects Used to Make 
Symptom Attributions 
128 
Source Primarya 
Attribution 
Secondaryb Tertiaryc 
Neglected Action .06 .14 .09 
Past Experience .17 .00 .oo 
Event or Activity .65 .45 .35 
Contagion .08 .06 .04 
Aspects of the Symptom .23 .16 .26 
Developed More Symptoms .00 .20 .26 
Suggestions from Others .02 .06 .04 
Other .01 .06 .13 
Note: The figures in this table reflect proportions of 
subjects. The response of some subjects contained more 
than one theme. Thus, columns add to more than 1.00. 
aN• 88. bN= 49. cN= 23. 
129 
affected by a noxious substance that had affected other 
people as well (e.g., "My boyfriend and I had eaten dinner 
together. He's a pretty healthy guy and he got sick too 
so I thought it must have been the sea food we ate"). 
Aspects of the symptom. The subject thought of a 
cause based upon some attribute of the symptom (e.g., "The 
nausea was intense and there was a grinding feeling in my 
stomach"). 
Developed more symptoms. The subject thought that a 
particular cause was operating when he or she developed 
additional symptoms (e.g., "[After a while] I developed 
diarrhea and got dizzy and felt weak"). 
Suggestions from others. The subject thought about 
a particular cause after someone else had proposed it 
(e.g., "My mom said that it might have been a bladder 
infection"). 
From Table 25 it can be seen that most of the 
respondents said that event cues and, to a lesser extent, 
symptom cues were the most useful in making symptom 
attributions. Although information from past experience 
was thought to play a major role, the data show that such 
experience was not helpful beyond the primary attribution. 
When two independent raters used the categories of 
Table 25 to classify subjects' responses for the primary 
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attribution, it was found that there was agreement on 84% 
of the cases. This was found to be significantly greater 
than the agreement expected by chance (i.e., 30%), kappa= 
.77, Z= 10.04, £< .00005). 
Outcomes of Self-Treatment (Question ~ 
Belief in one's attribution. Table 26 shows the 
distributions of individuals who did and did not try to 
relieve their symptom. It is interesting to see that the 
percentage of those who attempted self-treatment steadily 
decreased from the primary to the tertiary attribution. 
This suggests that if subjects acquired attribution 
relevant information from the outcomes of self-treatment, 
it was most likely to occur during the earlier stages of 
the symptom. 
The attempt at self-treatment was analyzed for the 
31 people who made all three attributions. In result, it 
was found that the patterns of frequencies and statistical 
significance were very similar to that of Table 26. This 
indicates that the above findings are not due to the 
attrition of subjects across attributions. 
When subjects were asked to discuss how the outcome 
of self-treatment influenced the belief in their attri-
bution, several types of responses were found. Of the 13 
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Table 26 
Distributions of Respondents Who Did and Did Not Attempt 
to Relieve Their Symptom 
Attribution Frequency 
Relative 
Frequency 
Chi-Square 
Value 
--------------------------------------------------------
Primarya 
Attempted 79 
Did Not Attempt 33 
Secondaryb 
Attempted 40 
Did Not Attempt 30 
Tertiaryc 
Attempted 9 
Did Not Attempt 22 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1. 
aN• 112. bN• 70. CN=31. 
.71 18.89 <.0005 
.29 
.57 1. 43 .232 
.43 
.29 S.45 .020 
.71 
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individuals who noted that the outcomes cast doubt upon 
their attribution, all said that their symptom persisted. 
For example, there was one student who believed that a 
twitching in his hands was caused by lack of sleep. He 
treated his condition by going to bed so that he could get 
proper rest. When he awoke, the twitching was still there 
and he began to think that lack of sleep was probably not 
the cause of his symptom. When asked why he doubted his 
initial attribution he said, "I slept for a good amount of 
time and although the shaking stopped a little, it was 
still there. I didn't feel tired, but the shaking was 
still there." 
Table 27 shows that belief in an attribution was 
strengthened after self-treatment primarily when a symptom 
was relieved. For example, one student felt that his sore 
throat was caused by a lot of yelling that he was doing at 
a soccer game. He treated himself by restricting his 
vocal activity. When the pain subsided he was convinced 
that yelling was the cause. During the interview he said, 
"Since I was not using my voice and the pairi was getting 
better, I thought that yelling must have been the cause." 
There were three subjects who found support for 
their attribution when their symptom got worse or did not 
go away. One of these individuals had a headache that she 
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Table 27 
Perceived Explanations for Support of One'! Attr bution 
Following Self-Treatment Outcomes 
Explanation Primarya 
Symptom was Relieved .72 
Symptom Became Worse .09 
Or Did Not Go Away 
Attribution was .19 
Self-Evident 
Other .00 
Attribution 
Secondaryb 
.73 
.00 
.00 
.27 
Tertiaryc 
l. 00 
.00 
.00 
.oo 
Note: The figures in this table are proportions of 
subjects. 
a b c N= 32. N• 26. N= 6. 
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thought was caused by tension. She treated herself by 
eating something and found that the headache did not 
dissipate. In her own words she said, "Usually I can eat 
and make the headache go away. When I eat and the 
headache doesn't go away, I think that it must be stress." 
A few students reported that belief in their 
attribution was strengthened following self-treatment 
outcomes, but this was not actually the case. It appears 
that they simply felt that that their attribution was 
self-evident. For example, there was one student who 
thought that his muscle aches and chills were caused by 
the flu. He treated himself by resting, drinking fluids 
and taking aspirin. When asked why he thought that the 
outcome of his action strengthened the belief in his 
attribution he said, "Common knowledge -- starve a cold, 
feed a fever, drink plenty of fluids. Doctors will tell 
you to do this." 
When two independent raters used the categories in 
Table 27 to classify subjects' responses for the primary 
attribution it was found that there was agreement on 97% 
of the cases. This was found to be significantly greater 
than the agreement expected by chance (i.e., 57%), kappa= 
.93, != 6.80, E< .00005). 
Making ~ reattribution. Table 28 shows that 
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Table 28 
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for One'~ Primary 
Attribution (Following Self-Treatment Outcomes) and the 
Making of ! Secondary Attribution 
Made 
Secondary 
Attribution 
Yes 
No 
Belief in Primary Attribution 
Weakened Supported Unaffected 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
9 15 24 
( • 90) ( • 4 7) ( • 7 3 ) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
1 17 9 
( . 10 ) ( • 5 3 ) ( • 2 7) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
2 X (2, N• 75)• 8.10, £• .0174. 
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subjects tended to make a secondary attribution if their 
belief in the primary attribution was weakened or 
unaffected by self-treatment outcomes. If their belief 
was strengthened, however, subjects showed no tendency to 
make or not make a secondary attribution, ~2 (2, ~= 75)= 
8.10, £= .0174. This finding suggests that confirmation 
of one's attribution from self-treatment outcomes does not 
influence subsequent attributional activity. However, 
there is an inclination to make a reattribution if one's 
initial attribution is disconfirmed or unaffected. 
Table 29 examines the tendency of making a tertiary 
attribution in terms of the strength of one's belief in 
the secondary attribution following self-treatment 
outcomes. The above finding was not replicated, x2 (2, N= 
40)= 3.70, £• .1574. 
Sickness Beliefs (Question §_l_ 
The perception of being sick. When respondents were 
asked if they considered themselves to be sick, it was 
expected that most would have felt that they were not. 
Table 30 shows that this expectation had greatest support 
at the time of the primary attribution. However, the 
tendency to believe that one was not sick diminished 
over time. In fact, the subjects who made a tertiary 
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Table 29 
crosstabulation of the Belief strength for One'! Secondary 
Attribution (Following Self-Treatment Outcomes) and the 
Making of ~ Tertiary Attribution 
Belief in Secondary Attribution 
Weakened Supported unaffected 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
Yes 2 9 7 
Made ( • 5 0 ) ( • 3 5 ) ( • 7 0) 
Tertiary +---------+---------+---------+ 
Attribution No 2 17 3 
( • 5 0 ) ( • 6 5) ( • 3 0 ) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
------------------------~-------------------------------
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
x2 (2, N= 40)= 3.70, £= .1574. 
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Table 30 
Distributions of Respondents Who Did and Did Not Believe 
Attribution Frequency 
Relative 
Frequency 
Chi-Square 
Value 
--------------------------------------------------------
. a Primary 
Sick 26 .23 23.14 <.0005 
Not Sick 86 .77 
Secondaryb 
Sick 28 .40 2.80 .09 
Not Sick 42 .60 
Tertiaryc 
Sick 16 .52 0.03 .86 
Not Sick 15 .48 
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attribution showed no inclination to believe one way or 
another. This finding implies that there might be an 
automatic tendency to doubt that one is sick when faced 
with common symptoms, but that this is likely to change 
with the passage of time. It might be more difficult to 
rule out being sick when one's symptom persists. 
The perception of being sick was analyzed for the 31 
people who made all three attributions. In result, it was 
found that the patterns of frequencies and statistical 
significance were similar to that of Table 30. This 
suggests that the above findings are not due to the 
attrition of subjects across attributions. 
Making a reattribution. Table 31 shows that the 
perception of being sick at the time of the primary 
attribution did not inhibit the tendency to make a 
secondary attribution, ~2 (1, ~- 112)= 2.06, £= .1514. 
Similarly, Table 32 shows that the perception of being 
sick at the time of the secondary attribution did not 
inhibit the tendency to make a tertiary attribution, x2 
-
( 1 I N= 70)= 0.77, £= .3790. 
Lay Conferral (Question 21. 
Discussing symptoms with ~ consultants. Although 
it was expected that subjects would exhibit a tendency to 
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Table 31 
Crosstabulation of One'! Belief About Being Sick at the 
Time of the Primary Attribution and the Making of ~ 
Secondary Attribution 
Belief About Being Sick 
Sick Not Sick 
+---------+---------+ 
Yes 20 53 
Made ( • 77) ( • 6 2 ) 
Secondary +---------+---------+ 
Attribution No 6 33 
( • 2 3) ( • 3 8 ) 
+---------+---------+ 
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
2 X (1, N= 112)= 2.06, £• .1514. 
141 
Table 32 
Crosstabulation of One'! Belief About Being Sick at the 
Time of the Secondary Attribution and the Making of a 
Tertiary Attribution 
Belief About Being Sick 
Sick Not Sick 
+---------+---------+ 
Yes 15 18 
Made ( • 5 4 ) ( • 4 3 ) 
Tertiary +---------+---------+ 
Attribution No 13 24 
( • 46) ( • 5 7 ) 
+---------+---------+ 
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
2 X (1, N• 70)• 0.77, £• .3790. 
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discuss their symptom with others, Table 33 shows that 
this was true only at the time of the primary attribution. 
The same pattern of frequencies and statistical signifi-
cance was found for the 31 people who made all three 
attributions, thus indicating that findings are not due to 
the attrition of subjects across attributions. 
Table 34 shows that the number of consulted indi-
viduals steadily decreased over time. It was interesting 
to find that the average number of lay consultants at the 
time of the primary attribution was very close to that 
reported by Sanders (1982) for a similar group of college 
students (i.e., 2.7). 
Consistent with social comparison theory, students 
tended to talk about their symptom most often with friends 
(see Table 35). It was interesting, however, to see that 
they did not turn very often to siblings or roommates. 
Instead, they showed more of an inclination to have dis-
cussions with parents. Although this would not neces-
sarily be predicted by social comparison theory, it might 
have occurred because younger people are accustomed to 
seeking parental advice during times of doubt. 
The intention to discuss symptoms. Table 36 shows 
the distributions of subjects who did and did not intend 
to discuss their symptoms with others. There was no 
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Table 33 
Distributions of Respondents Who Did and Did Not Discuss 
Their Symptom With ~ Lay Consultant 
Attribution 
Primarya 
Discussed 
Frequency 
76 
Did Not Discuss 36 
Secondaryb 
Discussed 37 
Did Not Discuss 33 
Tertiaryc 
Discussed 13 
Did Not Discuss 18 
Relative 
Frequency 
.68 
.32 
.53 
.47 
.42 
.58 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1. 
aN• 112. bN• 70. CN• 31. 
Chi-Square 
Value 
14.29 <.0005 
0.23 .63 
0.81 .37 
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Table 34 
The Number of Individuals With Whom Subjects Discussed 
Their Symptom 
Range 
Attribution Median Minimum Maximum 
Primarya 2.56 1 20 
Secondaryb 2.00 1 15 
Tertiaryc 1.60 1 3 
Note: High maximum values were reported by three subjects 
who discussed their symptom during social gatherings. 
b N= 36. c N• 13. 
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Table 35 
Types of Individuals Whom Subjects Sought to Discuss 
Their Symptom 
Individual Sought 
Coworkers 
Friends 
Parents 
Siblings 
Other Relatives 
Roommates 
Clergy 
Spouse 
Other 
. a Primary 
.13 
.78 
.41 
.14 
.09 
.24 
.01 
.05 
.07 
Attribution 
Secondaryb 
.03 
.65 
.46 
.16 
.05 
.14 
.oo 
.03 
.03 
Tertiaryc 
.00 
.77 
.31 
.15 
.00 
.08 
.00 
.08 
.00 
Note: The figures in the table are proportions of 
subjects. Columns add to more than 1.00 because some 
subjects spoke with more than one type of individual. 
a b c N= 76. N= 37. N=l3. 
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Table 36 
Distributions of Respondents Who Did and Did Not Intend 
to Discuss Their Symptom With ~ Lay Consultant 
Attribution Frequency 
Relative 
Frequency 
Chi-Square 
Value 
--------------------------------------------------------
Primarya 
Intended 37 
Did Not Intend 39 
Secondaryb 
Intended 25 
Did Not Intend 12 
Tertiaryc 
Intended 11 
Did Not Intend 2 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1. 
aN• 76. bN= 37. cN=l3. 
.49 0.05 .82 
.51 
.68 4.57 .03 
.32 
.85 6.23 .01 
.15 
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observable inclination at the time of the primary attri-
bution. Over time, however, there was a steady increase 
in the proportion of individuals who wanted to discuss 
their symptom. 
The intention to discuss symptoms was analyzed for 
the 13 people who made all three attributions. In result, 
it was found that the patterns of frequencies and sta-
tistical significance were very similar to that of Table 
36, thus indicating that the above findings are not due to 
the attrition of subjects across attributions. 
It is interesting to consider this finding in light 
of what was found with the data in Table 33. Although the 
general tendency to talk with a lay consultant decreased 
over time, the individuals who did discuss their symptom 
apparently had an increasing desire to do so. 
The correlations of perceived discomfort with the 
intent to discuss one's symptom at the time of the 
primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions were -.11, 
.26, and .55, respectively. The same correlations for 
perceived seriousness were, in order, -.OS, .12, and .37. 
A similar pattern of coefficients was found with those 
individuals who made all three attributions. For 
discomfort, the correlations were .15, .14, and .SS, 
respectively. And for perceived seriousness the corre-
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lations were .03, .03, and .37, respectively. None of the 
coefficients reached the .OS level of significance, but it 
is worth noting that the relationship between subjective 
distress and the intent to discuss one's symptom tended to 
increase over time. This makes sense in terms of social 
comparison theory. If individuals had symptoms that were 
discomforting (either physically or psychologically) and 
they were unable to establish a cause at an early point, 
then the need for comparison information would probably 
increase over time. 
Lay consultants who made an attribution. Table 37 
reveals that lay consultants tended to make an attribution 
for subjects' symptoms only at the time of the primary 
attribution. It should be noted, however, that although 
statistical significance diminished across analyses, the 
relative distributions of responses remained somewhat 
constant. Just about two thirds of the subjects reported 
that a lay consultant made an attribution for his or her 
symptom at the point of the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary attribution. 
Table 38 indicates that lay consultants tended to 
make symptom attributions that were similar to those made 
by subjects. In addition, subjects reported that this 
made them believe more strongly in their attribution (see 
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Table 37 
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That ~ Lay 
consultant Did and Did Not Make ~ Symptom Attribution 
Attribution 
Primarya 
Did 
Did Not 
Secondaryb 
Did 
Did Not 
Tertiaryc 
Did 
Did Not 
Frequency 
49 
27 
22 
15 
9 
4 
Relative 
Frequency 
.65 
.35 
.60 
.40 
.69 
.31 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1. 
aN• 76. bN• 37. cN• 13. 
Chi-Square 
Value 
6.37 
1. 32 
1. 92 
E 
.01 
.25 
.17 
Table 38 
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That ~ Lay 
consultant Made a Similar or Different Symptom 
Attribution 
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Relative Chi-Square 
Attribution Frequency Frequency Value 
--------------------------------------------------------
Primarya 
Similar 39 .80 17.16 <.0005 
Different 10 .20 
Secondaryb 
Similar 17 .77 6.55 .01 
Different 5 .23 
Tertiaryc 
Similar 6 .67 1. 00 .32 
Different 3 .33 
Note: For each analysis, df= 1. 
a b c N• 49. N= 22. N= 9. 
151 
Table 39). Both of these trends were evident at the time 
of the primary and secondary attributions. 
The data for Tables 37, 38, and 39 were re-analyzed 
for the individuals who made all three attributions (Ns= 
13, 9, and 6, respectively). In result, it was found that 
the patterns of frequencies and statistical significance 
were similar for the subjects from Tables 37 and 38. 
However, the small number of subjects from Table 39 made 
it difficult to observe a response pattern. Overall, this 
suggests that the above findings are not due to the 
attrition of subjects across attributions. 
Making a reattribution. Table 40 shows that the 
belief strength in one's primary attribution following a 
lay consultant's causal ascription was unrelated to the 
tendency to make a secondary attribution, ~2 (2, N• 49)= 
3.28, £• .194. Likewise, Table 41 indicates that the 
belief strength in one's secondary attribution under the 
same conditions was unrelated to making a tertiary 
attribution, ~2 (2, ~- 22)= 3.18, £= .204. 
Lay consultants who did not make an attribution. In 
a number of instances, lay consultants did not propose a 
cause for the subject's symptom but said something that 
reportedly strengthened the belief in the subject's 
attribution. Table 42 depicts the types of information 
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Table 39 
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That They Did and 
Did Not Feel More Strongly About Their Attribution When 
It was Shared .ey ~ Lay Consultant 
Attribution 
Primarya 
Did 
Did Not 
Secondaryb 
Did 
Did Not 
Tertiaryc 
Did 
Did Not 
Frequency 
31 
8 
16 
1 
4 
2 
Relative 
Frequency 
.80 
.20 
.94 
.06 
.67 
.33 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1. 
a b c N• 39. N• 17. N• 6. 
Chi-Square 
Value 
13.56 <.0005 
13.24 <.0005 
0.67 .41 
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Table 40 
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for One'! Primary 
Attribution and the Making of ! Secondary Attribution 
Following an Attribution That Was Made ~ ! Lay Consultant 
Belief in Primary Attribution 
Strength- weak- Unaffected 
ened ened 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
Yes 21 6 5 
Made ( • 68) ( • 86) ( • 4 5) 
Secondary +---------+---------+---------+ 
Attribution No 10 1 6 
( • 3 2 ) ( .14 ) ( • 5 5) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
2 x (2, N• 49)• 3.28, E· .194. 
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Table 41 
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for One'~ Secondary 
Attribution and the Making of ! Tertiary Attribution 
Following an Attribution That Was Made ~ ! ~ Consultant 
Belief in Secondary Attribution 
strength- Weak- Unaffected 
ened ened 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
Yes 8 3 1 
Made ( . so) ( 1. 00) ( • 3 3) 
Tertiary +---------+---------+---------+ 
Attribution No 8 0 2 
( • so) ( • 0 0) ( . 6 7) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
2 X (2, N• 22)• 3.18, p• .204. 
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Table 42 
Types of lnformation that Supported Subjects' Symptom 
Attribution When the Lay Consultant Did Not Make an 
Attribution 
Type of Information 
The Lay Consultant Had 
a Similar Problem 
The Lay Consultant Agreed 
With The Attribution 
The Lay Consultant 
Gave Implied Support 
Frequencya 
6 
4 
8 
Relative 
Frequency 
.33 
.11 
.44 
Note: The data were collapsed across the primary and 
secondary attribution because the Ns were small. There 
were no data on this item for the tertiary attribution. 
aN• 18. 
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that fall into this category. 
In some cases a lay consultant noted that he or she 
had a problem that was similar to that of the subject. 
For example, there was one individual who felt that a 
piercing pain in her lower right abdomen was caused by 
hunger. When she described her encounter with a friend 
she noted the following: "She said that she had been 
feeling hunger pains lately. I said 'Yeh, I've been 
feeling these a lot lately too'." 
In other instances, the lay consultant simply agreed 
with the subject's appraisal of his or her condition. For 
example, one student had an itchy rash that he thought was 
caused by a chemical fertilizer that he encountered while 
playing soccer. When he described a discussion with a 
friend he said, "I told him what I thought was the cause 
of the rash, and he agreed with me." 
In still other instances, the lay consultant gave 
some type of implied support for the subject's attri-
bution. In other words, something was said that provided 
indirect or unintentional support. For example, one 
respondent had a headache that she believed was caused by 
tension. During the interview she described what a work 
associate told her: "She said that this place can drive 
you nuts. She's a ward secretary like me and does similar 
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kinds of work." 
There was a total of five people who felt that the 
lay consultant made a comment that cast doubt upon their 
attribution. Obviously, there were not enough cases to 
form meaningful groupings. However, it appeared as though 
the lay consultant basically discounted the subject's 
attribution. For example, there was one student who had a 
headache that he believed was caused by too much smoking. 
He discussed his friend's reaction to this by saying, "My 
friend thought I was crazy. He's a lifetime smoker and he 
never got a headache from cigarettes." 
When two independent raters used the categories In 
Table 42 to classify subjects' responses for the primary 
attribution it was found that there was agreement on 93% 
of the cases. This was found to be significantly greater 
than the agreement expected by chance (i.e., 37%), kappa• 
.89, !• 4.69, £< .00005). 
Making ~ reattribution. Table 43 shows that the 
belief strength in one's primary attribution following a 
lay consultant's comments was unrelated to the tendency to 
make a secondary attribution, ~2 (2, N= 27)= 0.79, £~ 
.673. Similarly, Table 44 indicates that the belief 
strength in one's secondary attribution under the same 
conditions was unrelated to making a tertiary attribution, 
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Table 43 
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for One'~ Primary 
Attribution and the Making of a Secondary Attribution 
Following ~ Discussion in Which ~ Lay Consultant Did Not 
Make an Attribution 
Made 
Secondary 
Attribution 
Yes 
No 
Belief in Primary Attribution 
Strength- weak- Unaffected 
ened ened 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
11 
( • 7 3 ) 
2 
(1.00) 
7 
( • 7 0) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
4 0 3 
( • 2 7) ( • 00) ( • 3 0) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
x
2 (2, N• 27)• o.79, E- .673. 
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Table 44 
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for One'~ Secondary 
Attribution and the Making of a Tertiary Attribution 
Following ! Discussion in Which ! Lay Consultant Did Not 
Make an Attribution 
Yes 
Made 
Tertiary 
Attribution No 
Belief in Secondary Attribution 
Strength- Weak- Unaffected 
ened ened 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
2. 0 3 
( • 6 7) ( • 00) ( • 30) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
1 
( • 3 3) 
2 
( 1. 00) 
7 
( • 70) 
+---------+---------+---------+ 
--------------------------------------------------------
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
x2 (2, N• 15)• 2.25, £• .279. 
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2 X (2, N= 15)= 2.55, £= .279. 
use of Medical Guides and Health Professionals (Question 
The data in Tables 45 and 46 are fairly clear. It is 
evident that few subjects consulted medical guides or 
health professionals to help them diagnose their symptoms. 
However, it was found that subjects were more likely to 
visit a health professional than read a medical guide at 
the time of the tertiary attribution, Cochran Q (1, N• 
31)• 5.00, £• .0253. These analyses indicate that indi-
viduals who experience common symptoms are not likely to 
seek, and thus not use, attribution information that is 
acquired from formal or professional sources (even though 
they are relatively more likely to see a doctor or nurse 
during the latter course of their symptom). 
The use of medical guides and health professionals 
were re-analyzed for those individuals who made all three 
attributions (N= 31 for each analysis). In both cases it 
was found that the patterns of frequencies and statistical 
significance were very similar to that in Tables 45 and 
46. Hence, the above findings are probably not due to to 
the attrition of subjects across attributions. 
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Table 45 
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That They Did and 
Did Not Refer to a Medical Guide 
Attribution 
Primarya 
Did 
Did Not 
Secondaryb 
Did 
Did Not 
Tertiaryc 
Did 
Did Not 
Frequency 
6 
106 
3 
66 
0 
31 
Relative 
Frequency 
.OS 
.95 
.04 
.96 
.oo 
1. 00 
Chi-Square 
Value 
89.29 <.0005 
57.52 <.0005 
31.00 <.0005 
--------------------------------------------------------
Note: For each analysis, df• 1. 
aN• 112. bN• 69. CN• 31. 
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Table 46 
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That They Did and 
Did Not Se~k Professional Medical Help 
Attribution Frequency 
Relative 
Frequency 
Chi-Square 
Value 
--------------------------------------------------------
Primary a 
Did 12 
Did Not 100 
Secondaryb 
Did 5 
Did Not 65 
Tertiaryc 
Did 5 
Did Not 26 
Note: For each analysis, df• 1. 
aN• 112. bN• 70. CN• 31. 
.11 69.14 <.0005 
.89 
.07 51. 43 <.0005 
.93 
.16 14.23 <.0005 
.84 
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Doubt-Provoking Information (Question 2.1 
Types of doubt-provoking information. When subjects 
were asked if there was anything that made them think that 
their attribution might be wrong, nine themes or cate-
gories emerged. These are listed in Table 47. Surpris-
ingly, about half the categories were found to be similar 
to those in Table 25. This would indicate that indi-
viduals draw upon a similar range of information to aid 
them in deciding the likelihood and unlikelihood of 
symptom attributions. Each of the categories are de-
scribed below. 
Neglected action. The subjects doubted an attri-
bution when there was a recollection that he or she 
neglected to do something that would keep him or her from 
developing a symptom. For example, one student initially 
thought that her headache was caused by stress but then 
changed her mind. She said, "I didn't eat much that day. 
I just had juice in the morning. I thought that that 
might be causing the headache." 
Unexpected symptom behavior. The subject was 
inclined to discount an attribution because the behavior 
of his or her symptom was not consistent with that attri-
bution (e.g., the symptom persisted too long, went away 
too soon, or acted in an unusual or unpredictable way). 
Table 47 
Sources of Information that Cast Doubt Upon One's 
Symptom Attribution 
Source Primarya 
Neglected Action .08 
Unexpected symptom Behavior .38 
Developed Unexpected .13 
Symptoms 
Attribution/Self-perception .12 
Inconsistency 
Event/Activity .19 
Suggestions From Others .10 
Doctor's Diagnosis .00 
Lack of Expected symptoms .02 
Contagion .08 
Other .02 
Attribution 
Secondaryb 
.oo 
.29 
.16 
.13 
.10 
.00 
.10 
.19 
.03 
.06 
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t . c Ter iary 
.07 
.43 
.oo 
.21 
.07 
.07 
.07 
.07 
.00 
.00 
Note: The figures in this table represent proportions of 
subjects. Response of some subjects contained more than 
one theme. Thus, some columns add to more than 1.00. 
aN• 52. bN~ 31. CN• 14. 
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One student initially thought that her stomach ache was 
cased by drinking too much Cola. She doubted this later. 
Her comment about this was, "I wouldn't expect sharp pains 
from the Coke. I had sharp pains." 
Developed unexpected symptoms. There was doubt 
regarding an attribution when the individual experienced 
additional symptoms that were not consistent with his or 
her attribution. One person thought that a swollen left 
ear was caused by trauma which he sustained while wres-
tling with a friend. He then felt that this was not the 
case when he developed an unexpected symptom. He said, 
"My ear was turning black on the inside and I thought that 
getting hit on the outside of the ear wouldn't affect the 
inside of the ear." 
Attribution / self-perception inconsistency. This 
category is actually called "Inconsistency between One's 
Attribution and the Observation of One Self, One's 
activity, or One's past experience." Basically, the 
respondent discounted an attribution because it was 
inconsistent with knowledge of his or her actions, be-
haviors or past experience. For example, there was one 
student who had a headache that he initially thought was 
caused by lack of sleep. He mentioned that he discredited 
this idea by saying, "I knew how much sleep I had during 
the week. I knew I was getting eight hours of sleep a 
day." 
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Event I activity. The respondent thought that his 
or her attribution might be incorrect based upon the 
observation of some event or activity. One student had a 
headache that he thought was due to eye strain. When 
asked why he began to doubt this he said, "Just the fact 
that I knew that I had been stressed out for a while. I 
had a lot of school work to do and I had a few personal 
problems." 
Suggestions from others. Doubt regarding an 
attribution occurred when someone suggested an alternative 
explanation for one's symptom. For example, one respon-
dent had a sore throat and fever that he believed was 
caused by the cold weather. When he was asked why he 
started to discount this he said, "My friend mentioning 
that I could have mono." 
Doctor's diagnosis. Individuals abandoned their 
symptom attribution when a physician made a contrary 
diagnosis. 
Lack of expected symptoms. The doubt about an 
attribution began to occur when someone did not get 
expected symptoms. One student, for example, had a fever 
that he thought was due to the flu. When asked why he 
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gave up on this idea he said, "I didn't have nausea." 
Contagion. Doubt regarding an attribution occurred 
when an individual thought he or she was infected by 
someone who had a contagious condition or was affected by 
a noxious substance that had affected other people as 
well. There was one person who thought that his sore 
throat was due to his being "run down." He was asked why 
he felt that this attribution might not be correct. He 
said, "My roommate had been sick earlier and I thought I 
might have picked up something from him." 
Looking at that the overall proportions in Table 47 
it can be seen that most of the respondents said that 
doubt about an attribution was provoked by symptom cues, 
especially the unexpected behavior of symptoms. A fewer, 
but noteworthy, number also mentioned event cues and the 
perception of inconsistency as described above. 
Persuasion and expectancy/outcome incongruity were 
discussed earlier in terms of their presumed ability to 
promote reattributions. The data suggest that both are 
possible, but the latter is much more likely to occur. In 
fact, expectancy/outcome incongruity appears to be a most 
influential factor. 
Making a reattribution. The last two tables 
describe the relationship between doubt-provoking infor-
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mation and subsequent attribution activity. Table 48 
shows that when subjects believed there was something to 
suggest doubt in their primary attribution, they tended to 
make a secondary attribution. When doubt was absent, they 
tended to retain their primary attribution, ! 2 (1, ~-
112)• 24.59, E< .00005. Table 49 replicates this finding 
for the secondary and tertiary attributions, x2 (1, N= 
70)• 4.47, E• .0345. 
Table 48 
Crosstabulation of the Presence of Doubt-Provoking 
Information for the Primary Attribution and the 
Making of ! Secondary Attribution 
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Doubt-Provoking Information 
Yes 
Made 
Secondary 
Attribution No 
Present Absent 
+---------+---------+ 
49 24 
( . 88) ( • 4 3 ) 
+---------+---------+ 
7 
( .12) 
32 
( • 5 7) 
+---------+---------+ 
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
2 X (1, N• 112)• 24.59, £< .00005. 
Table 49 
Crosstabulation of the Presence of Doubt-Provoking 
Information for the Secondary Attribution and the 
Making of ~ Tertiary Attribution 
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Doubt-Provoking Information 
Present Absent 
+---------+---------+ 
Yes 19 14 
Made (.61) ( • 36 ) 
Tertiary +---------+---------+ 
Attribution No 12 25 
( • 39) ( • 6 4 ) 
+---------+---------+ 
--------------------------------------------------------
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions, 
2 X (1, N• 70)• 4.47, £• .0345. 
DISCUSSION FOR STUDY 2 
There are four conclusions about the naive 
diagnostician that can be drawn from the results of study 
2. Each of these is discussed below. 
A NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTIONS ARE TYPICALLY MADE DURING THE 
COURSE OF A SYMPTOM. 
The results of Study 2 have shown that 63% of the 
subjects thought about two or more causes for their symp-
tom. It appears that multiple attributions are typical of 
self-diagnosis. The naive diagnostician probably needs to 
consider a number of potential causes because he or she 
does not collect systematic data. As such, attributions 
are made and then evaluated for accuracy with information 
that is easily available. This is in contrast to the 
diagnostic activity of young medical students who are 
content with the first plausible diagnosis that comes to 
mind and are inclined to favor evidence that supports it 
(Mentzer & Snyder, 1982). 
It was surprising to find that the number of attri-
butions made by subjects was related only to symptom 
duration and attributional response. Although symptom 
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enumeration was discussed in Study 1 as a possible 
individual difference variable, the results of Study 2 
show that it bore no relationship to attributional effort. 
In other words, the extent to which perceived causes came 
to mind was unrelated to how much work one actually put 
into his or her self-diagnosis. If diagnostic effort is 
independent of symptom features (e.g., discomfort, seri-
ousness, prior experience), and health-related personality 
traits (e.g., private body consciousness), it would appear 
that the naive diagnostician relies heavily upon cognitive 
activity. The results of Study 2 suggest that incon-
sistency between one's attribution and symptom activity is 
a major driving force of attributional effort. This will 
be discussed in more detail later. 
ATTRIBUTIONS ARE TRIGGERED PRIMARILY BY EVENT AND SYMPTOM 
CUES. 
The analysis of open-ended responses found that 
different types of information were useful for making 
symptom attributions. However, the most useful were 
events and activities that occurred at or around the time 
of the symptom. Following this were aspects of the symp-
tom and the development of additional symptoms. Although 
prior experience was thought to be a rich source of 
information, it was not found to be useful beyond the 
primary attribution. 
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The generalization of this finding to older indi-
viduals is questionable. The subjects of Study 2 were 
young, healthy college students who have not experienced a 
great deal of illness. In addition, they are involved in 
an active social and academic life that includes experi-
ences such as dating, socialization, stressful exami-
nations and so on. Hence, it is not difficult to see why 
these individuals rely more upon event cues than past 
experience cues. If older or infirm groups of people were 
surveyed, it might be found that the relative usefulness 
of these cues would be different past experience cues 
might be given equal or more weight than event cues. 
The fact that subjects relied upon symptom 
information to help them make an attribution appears to be 
consistent with the illness prototype model, but not with 
the hypothesis verification model. The latter presumes 
that symptoms confirm an existing hypothesis about the 
cause of an ill feeling. Many of the subjects in Study 2, 
however, used the quality and behavior of symptoms to 
generate a hypothesis. At the outset of this study it was 
believed that symptom attributes were important to the 
naive diagnostician, but it was not realized how imper-
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tant. Although the qualities of symptoms do not seem to 
account for the number of attributions that were made, 
they do appear to be a major influence for the ~ of 
attributions that were made. 
THE NAIVE DIAGNOSTICIAN TENDS TO MAKE INNOCUOUS AND 
MANAGEABLE ATTRIBUTIONS FOR SYMPTOMS. 
Consistent with Study 1, the subjects in Study 2 
made attributions that were predominately internal, 
controllable and unstable. This demonstrates that the 
subjects from both studies tended to think of harmless and 
manageable causes for symptoms. 
At the time of Study 1 it was felt that subjects' 
benign causes could be explained in three ways: (1) by 
the nature of the experimental task (being provided with 
common, harmless symptoms), (2) by some form of intrinsic 
response tendency such as a motivational bias, and (3) by 
the fact that most young and healthy people are not 
typically bothered with serious conditions (and thus are 
not considered during self-diagnosis). 
The results from Study 2 have shown that individuals 
made benign and manageable attributions for a variety of 
real symptoms that covered a wide range of perceived 
discomfort and seriousness. It is therefore logical to 
assume that thinking of these types of causes is not 
simply an experimental artifact. 
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The results, however, cannot discredit either of the 
other two explanations. It was mentioned earlier that 
Ditto et al. (1988) found that subjects tended to mitigate 
the threat of illness when they were erroneously informed 
that a they had pancreatic disease. The authors argue 
that there is an automatic tendency to minimize illness 
threat. Likewise, Robinson (1971) has noted that it is 
common for people to think of benign interpretations of a 
symptom when it is experienced by all members of a family 
or when it is an expected part of one's role (e.g., 
tiredness of a blue collar worker). Hence, a motivational 
bias and the low incidence of serious conditions in one's 
life can both account for the types of causes that were 
found in Studies 1 and 2. Whatever the explanation, the 
tendency to think of innocuous and manageable causes for 
symptoms is evident. However, additional research will 
need to be done in order to shed additional light upon 
this matter. 
SYMPTOM REATTRIBUTIONS ARE STIMULATED PRIMARILY BY 
INCONSISTENCY. 
One of the goals of Study 2 was to examine factors 
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that nurture and inhibit symptom reattributions. It was 
believed that the outcome of self-treatment, the per-
ception of being sick, discussions with lay consultants, 
visits with health professionals, and information in 
medical guides would be sources of such influence. 
It was found that some of these factors are 
consistent throughout the course of one's symptom, while 
others are not. Subjects rarely visited a health pro-
fessional or read a medical guide to help them interpret 
their symptom. The former is not surprising given that 
college age people are known to be low users of health 
care providers (NCHS, 1981; sanders, 1982) and, indeed, 
are usually quite healthy. Collectively, however, these 
findings indicate that doctors, nurses, and medical guides 
are consistently not utilized as sources of attributional 
information. These sources could certainly be helpful, 
but they are not commonly sought by young, healthy 
individuals. 
The frequency of those who treated their symptom and 
those who discussed it with a lay consultant was high at 
the beginning. However, this changed. By the time of the 
tertiary attribution, subjects reported that they were not 
treating their symptom and that they had no preference for 
talking with a lay consultant. This suggests that attri-
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butional information from these sources would come early 
during the course of one's symptom. 
The perception of being sick also showed change over 
time. At first, subjects tended to believe that they were 
not sick. By the time of the tertiary attribution the 
tendency disappeared. If this perception is influential, 
one would expect to see reattributions primarily towards 
the beginning of symptomatic episodes. 
The results demonstrated that reattributions were 
not reliably related to any of the above factors. 
Although subjects felt that the belief in their attri-
bution was influenced, there was no systematic connection 
with behavior. 
Only one analysis uncovered a correlate. Subjects 
tended to make a secondary attribution if the belief in 
their primary attribution was weakened or unaffected by 
the outcome of self-treatment. If the belief was 
strengthened, they showed no tendency to make or not make 
a secondary attribution. 
This finding is most unusual and should be 
interpreted carefully. If the outcome of self-treatment 
is influential, one would expect to see people making 
reattributions when their attribution belief is weakened, 
and not making reattributions when their belief is 
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strengthened. Perhaps this is what might have been 
happening, but the sample size (N= 75) was too small to 
detect it. In fact, a larger sample size would have been 
more favorable for the interpretation of the other 
reattribution analyses. 
The most interpretable findings were related to 
subjects' responses about doubt-provoking information. 
The last two tables in the results section show that when 
subjects had doubt about their attribution they tended to 
make a reattribution, otherwise they did not. An analysis 
of open-ended responses found that subjects doubted their 
attribution when it was inconsistent with subsequent symp-
tom behavior. Doubt was also provoked when they developed 
unexpected symptoms or did not experience symptoms that 
were expected. The inconsistency between an attribution 
and the perception of one's actions or past experience 
also provoked doubt. Although not related to incon-
sistency, events that suggested another plausible cause 
for one's symptom appeared to have a similar effect. 
A Model of the Naive Diagnostician 
The facts that have been learned from this study can 
be synthesized into a model of the naive diagnostician. 
Although this cannot represent the experience of everyone, 
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it summarizes the accounts of many individuals who were 
involved in this study. 
Figure 2 shows that when a symptom is experienced, 
an attribution is made by evaluating event and/or symptom 
cues. Doubt is cast upon the attribution if one or more 
of the following occur: (1) the symptom behaves in an 
unexpected fashion, (2) unexpected symptoms occur, (3) 
there is inconsistency between an attribution and the 
observation of one's past actions or experience, (4) 
expected symptoms do not occur, and (5) an event suggests 
another plausible cause. If there is doubt, the indi-
vidual evaluates current event and symptom cues in order 
to make a reattribution. If none of the doubt-provoking 
events occurs, one's attribution or reattribution is 
retained for the duration of the symptom. The individual 
finally concludes that the symptom was caused by the 
factor that was on his or her mind at the end of the 
symptom episode. 
The model in Figure 2 can provide insight to the 
delay in seeking medical care that is characteristic of 
heart attack victims (e.g., see Green at al., 1974). It 
was noted earlier that many individuals misdiagnose the 
prodromal symptoms of a myocardial infarction as indi-
gestion. This might be related to the nature of the 
Syll'f)lom 
Evaluale Ewnl 
and Syl'flllOln 
Cues 
Altrbullon 
Figure 2. A Model of the Naive Diagnostician. 
YES YES YES YES YES 
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Allrbullon 
NO 
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00 
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symptom (a painful chest discomfort) as well as the time 
at which it occurs (after eating a meal). If the symptom 
and event cues indicate indigestion to the perceiver, this 
is the attribution that will be retained until something 
casts doubt upon it. The victim will begin to change his 
or her mind when the presumed indigestion does not dissi-
pate within an expected period of time, or when unexpected 
symptoms such as severe chest pains occur. In either 
case, this takes time. Time that might prove to be fatal. 
Applications 
The application of research findings must always be 
made carefully. However, it appears that knowledge 
acquired from this study could be useful in at least two 
ways. 
First, health professionals should be apprised of 
the characteristics of the naive diagnostician. They 
should learn how lay individuals think about the causes of 
their symptoms. If for no other reason, this will reify 
the notion that average individuals possess ways of 
thinking that are quite different from what is learned 
through professional education, a point that is often 
forgotten. A knowledge of the naive diagnostician could 
provide direction for research in problematic areas such 
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as non-compliance and the delay in seeking health care. 
In addition, it could potentially increase the general 
impact of health care practice by creating a tangible 
model of how patients think. This could be used to 
maximize the efficacy of therapeutic interventions (cf. 
Gillick, 1985). 
Second, patients and other lay individuals should be 
introduced to the tendencies of their thinking about 
symptoms. This could be accomplished through patient or 
community education programs. By learning about naive 
diagnostic reasoning, people can become aware of how 
natural inclinations at self-diagnosis can have a major 
impact upon their health. In all, this could promote 
considerable insight as well as a sense of mastery about 
one's own health care management. 
Conclusion 
Using a survey approach, Study 2 examined the 
attributional activity of young adults who experienced a 
real symptom. The purpose of this was to discover the 
ways in which symptom attributions are formed and altered 
over time. 
The results of Study 2 were synthesized into a model 
of the naive diagnostician. This model posits that a 
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symptom attribution is initially triggered by event and 
symptom cues. If one encounters something that casts 
doubt upon that attribution, he or she makes a ~attri­
bution. If not, the perceived cause is retained until the 
symptom dissipates. 
The model of the naive diagnostician offers a new 
perspective on the topic of symptom attribution. It is a 
simple model that has its origin in the accounts of young 
adults who have experienced real symptoms. Its major 
distinguishing feature is that it views symptom attri-
butions in the context of a dynamic process -- a kind of 
trial and error. This does not guarantee diagnostic 
accuracy, but it recognizes the average person as an 
active participant in his or her self-diagnosis. 
In the future, research efforts should be focused 
upon tests of the model. For example, it will be 
important to see how well the model predicts the self-
diagnosi s of older adults as well as post-attributional 
behaviors such as self-treatment strategies and the 
decisions to seek health case. Overall, the model needs 
to be pushed to its limits in order to discover its 
strengths and weaknesses. As this is done, more will be 
known about the naive diagnostician. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. A colostomy is a surgical procedure that routes 
the colon to an artificial exit in the abdomen. 
Waste is collected in a small plastic bag. Spillage 
occurs when the seal between the bag and the abdomen 
becomes loose. Many spillages are due to a watery 
discharge. 
2. Students were asked to record their grade point 
average as a proxy measure for intelligence. 
However, only eight individuals could provide this 
information because most were first year freshmen. 
As such, the variable was not reported nor used in 
any analyses. 
3. The dimensions of locus, stability, and 
controllability -- and the dimensions of 
internality, stability, and globality appear to be 
similar in nature. In addition, both schemes have 
been used in attributional research. However, the 
former dimensions have been used primarily in 
studies where the investigator has classified 
perceived causes, whereas the latter dimensions have 
been used in studies where subjects have classified 
or rated perceived causes. Therefore, the former 
dimensions were used in the present study because 
the investigator was classifying subjects' per-
ceived causes and because the scheme appeared to 
be more applicable to the present research. 
4. An important distinction needs to be made here. 
A cause was considered controllable if it was felt 
that an individual could exert an influence on the 
cause itself, not the resulting symptom. Thus, an 
allergy was classified as uncontrollable because 
there is nothing that the average individual can do 
to influence his or her immune system, even though 
one can take a non-prescription drug that will 
alleviate the symptoms of an allergy. 
5. This was a finding from a survey of college 
students that was conducted by the investigator 
at an earlier time. 
6. Subjects' position at the university was 
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not used in the multiple regression analyses 
because of its high correlation with age. In 
197 
a one-way analysis of variance it was found that 
student position accounted for 84% of the variance 
in age, ! (2, 32) • 86.76, £ < .00005 (it should be 
noted here that there were three classes of student 
position: "freshman," "sophomore," and "junior & 
senior" because there was only one subject who was 
a senior). Including both the age and position 
variables in the regression would have created a 
multicolinearity problem. 
7. The enumeration scores of the four other 
symptoms were averaged (rather than entered as 
a set) because of their moderate interrelationship. 
When all five scores were intercorrelated it was 
found that the Pearson coefficients ranged from 
.20 to .63. The average was .44. Seven of the ten 
coefficients were statistically significant (all 
£'S ~ .011), and two others approached the .05 
level of significance (£'S - .061 and .075). Again, 
there was a concern about multicolinearity. 
8. The means in Table 8 are higher then what can 
be computed from the frequencies in Tables 2-6. 
This is because the means in Table 8 are a function 
of everything that was listed by subjects. The 
frequencies in the other tables are a function of 
categories that were created by grouping similar 
responses. For example, if a student wrote that 
a headache can be caused by (1) pressure, (2) 
stress, (3) tension, and (4) an allergy, he or she 
received an enumeration score of 4. This is 
because enumeration was viewed as a measure of the 
extent to which causes came to mind. The score 
was thought to be a reflection of cognitive activ-
ity. However, grouping the types of causes that 
were mentioned by the above student, only categories 
of "stress" and "an allergy" would be checked. This 
is because the first and third responses are synony-
mous with stress. If grouping did not occur in this 
fashion, Tables 2-6 would be unmanageably large. 
9. Before Study 2 was conducted, eight subjects 
were interviewed with the Symptom Attribution 
Survey. The purpose of these pilot interviews was 
to test the instrument and to correct any problems 
with it. 
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10. In addition to this, scheduling was a constant 
11. 
problem throughout the eight months that data were 
collected (11/3/86 - 6/24/87). Having to schedule 
two visits with each subject would have signifi-
cantly increased the time needed to collect data. 
For subjects who believed that their symptom 
could have multiple causes, their enumeration score 
was the number of entries for item 17. For those 
who believed that their symptom could only have one 
cause, their enumeration score was assigned a value 
of 1. 
12. Data on the subjective meaning of "being sick" 
were collected, but are not reported in this study. 
13. If more than one person was consulted, the 
subject was asked to focus upon the first person 
with whom he or she talked. 
14. At the outset of Study 2 there was an interest 
in analyzing the tendency to make a reattribution as 
a function of the information from health pro-
fessionals and medical guides. It was found, how-
ever, that only a few people discussed their symptom 
with a physician or sought the help from a medical 
guide. As a result, an analysis could not be 
conducted because there were not enough subjects to 
create contingency tables with cell sizes greater 
than one or two. In a number of instances cell 
frequencies were zero, thus making it impossible 
to create two dimensional contingency tables. 
15. It should be kept in mind that these figures 
reflect a national sample. Because college under-
graduates are a subsample of those 15-24 years of 
age, the percentage of seeking health care for a 
headache might be lower than 13.6%. 
16. Symptom duration exhibited a great deal of 
variability. The following is a more detailed 
description: 
Symptom Proportion 
Duration of Sample 
< 1 day 
1 - 2.5 days 
.34 
.16 
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3 - 4 days .08 
5 - 6 days .04 
1 week .09 
1+ - 4 weeks .24 
6 - 22 weeks .OS 
17. In order to compare the actual attributions 
made by subjects in Studies 1 and 2 it was impor-
tant that the symptoms be as similar as possible. 
The decision was made that a subject from Study 2 
would be selected for this analysis if and only 
if he or she had a symptom that was identical to 
one of the hypothetical symptoms presented in Study 
1 and there .!!..!.!. .!!..!?. other coexisting symptoms. 
Thus, subjects who experienced a headache, upset 
stomach, or sore throat satisfied this criterion. 
APPENDIX A 
SYMPTOM SURVEY 
This is a short survey about peoples' perceptions of the causes for physical symptoms. 
On the following pages, we would like you to write down what you feel are the possible 
causes for five common symptoms. 
Please read the instructions on each page and take as much time as you need. If 
you have any questions, please notify the study coordinator. 
We wish to thank you in advance for your participation in this study. 
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for: 
A HEADACHE 
Take your time and Ust as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or 
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to 
mind. 
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need. 
Use the back of this sheet If you need more space to write. 
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for: 
WATERVEVES 
Take your time and list as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or 
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to 
mind. 
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need. 
Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write. 
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for: 
A CONGESTED NOSE 
Take your time and list as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or 
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to 
mind. 
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need. 
Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write. 
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for: 
AN UPSET STOMACH 
Take your time and list as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or 
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to 
mind. 
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need. 
Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write. 
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for: 
A SORE THROAT 
Take your time and list as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or 
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to 
mind. 
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need. 
14 
Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write. 
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1-(1) (4) 
1. Please write in your age on the line below. 
(5) (6) 
2. Please circle your gander category. 
1. Male 2. Female (7) 
3. Please circle the one category that best describes your racial affiliation. 
1. Caucasian 4. Oriental/Asian or Pacific Islander 
(not a Hispanic Origin) 
(8) 
2. Black 5. American Indian or Alaskan Native 
3. Hispanic 6. Other (please specify ______ _, 
4. Please circle the one category that best describes your position at LoyolL 
1. Freshman 4. Senior 
2. Sophomore 5. Unclassttied Student 
3. Junior 6. Other (please specify _____ __, 
5. Ara you a nursing or other type of health professions student? (note that 
Individuals who are enrolled In premedical and pradantal programs are nm 
health professions students). 
(circle one) 
1. Yes 2. No 
6. Ara you a trained health professional (such as a nurse or physical 
therapist)? (circle one) 
1. Yes 2. No 
7. Please write In your overall grade point average on the line below. If you do 
not know your GPA or are unsure of It, put an "X" on the line. 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) (14) 
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APPENDIX B 
SYMPTOM ATTRIBUTION 
SURVEY 
An interview schedule to assess the cognitions and behaviors 
of making attributions for physical symptoms 
James M. Sinacore 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Department of Psychology 
2-{1) - - - -(6) (7) {8) -(10) (TI) (12) 
Date _____ _ Subject number ____ _ 
Interviewer __________________ _ 
Form sas-011287 
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INTRODUCTION 
This interview deals with the experience of bodily sensations and physical symptoms. 
l would like to talk with you for a few minutes about the symptoms that you have 
experienced within the last 3 to 4 weeks. I am interested in how you as an individual 
think about your symptoms--so there are no right or wrong answers to the questions 
that I am going to ask you. I'd like you to respond to my questions in any way that 
reflects your personal understanding of your symptoms. 
In our discussion today I am using the word "symptom• to refer to any uncomfortable or 
unpleasant bodily sensation such as a headache, sore musdes, upset stomach, 
earache, and anything else like that. I also am using the word "symptom" to refer to any 
unusual change in body appearance or function such as hair loss, skin discoloration, 
blurred vision, painless lumps, and anything else like that 
As we continue our discussion, do not hesitate to stop me in order to clarify a question 
for you. It is important that you understand each question -- and answer it in terms of 
your own thinking. If you happen to think of something along the way that you forgot to 
mention earlier, just tell me and I'll go back and modify any of your answers. 
Do you have any questions before we get started? 
•rr111l'llom: --------
(13) (14)(15) (16) 
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01. As you know, there are times when we experience a single symptom -- and there 
are times when we experience a number of symptoms all at the same time. For 
our discussion today I'd like you to think about your experience with a symptom 
or set of symptoms that occurred sometime within the last 3 to 4 weeks. 
Please tell me what the symptom or symptoms were. 
------------(17) (18) (29) 
During the interview, I want us to talk about the most recent occurrence of this 
symptomatic experience. Please do not refer to earlier occurrences unless I ask 
you to. 
02. About how long ago did the symptom(s) start to appear? 
03. Are you still feeling the symptom(s)? 
1 -- yes [go to a. 4) 
2--no* 
• Pf single ~m go to a. &J 
• pr multiple ~ma go to a. 5) 
(30)(31) 
(32) 
04. In your estimation, about how how far along are you in terms of the course of your 
symptom(s)? Would you say that you are at the begining, -- toward the middle, --
or toward the end? 
1 -- begining 
2-middle 
3-end (33) 
I realize that you are still experiencing your symptom(s) to some degree, but 
during our discussion I'll refer to it (them) in the past tense. This is because most 
people who I am talking with are no longer feeling their symptom. If this becomes 
confusing, just stop me and I'll try to rephrase my question. Is that OK? * 
• Pf single ~m go to a. &J 
• pr multiple ayrr¢oma go to a. 5) 
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05. Do you think that your symptoms were related in some way? In other words. do 
you think that your symptoms were interconnected? 
1 -- yes (34) 
2 -- no [circle BYl'l1*>m that subject wtll 
talk about and go to Q.6] 
Since you feel that these symptoms were interconnec1ed, I will refer to them as a 
symptom cluster as we continue our discussion. Is that OK? 
06. I would like you to tell me a few fac1s about your symptom (cluster). I am 
particularly interested in the following. 
(a) Using the response scale on page 1 of your handout, select a number that 
indicates how much physical discomfort your symptom (cluster) caused you. 
Please note that a 1 indicates "very little discomfort• -· and 1 O indicates •a lot 
of discomfort." 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(b) About how long did the symptom (cluster) last? 
[If &yn1)tom la still present. ask Instead: How long has your symptom 
(cluster) lasted?) 
(35) 
(36)(37) (38)(39) 
(c) Using the response scale on page 2 of your handout. select a number that 
indicates how serious you thought your symptom (cluster) was. Please 
note that a 1 indicates •not very serious• -- and 10 indicates "very serious." 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(d) Were there any common or routine activities - no matter how small -- that 
your symptom (cluster) made difficult or unusually hard to do? 
1 ··yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 7] 
(e) What activities were affected, and in what way were they affec1ed? 
(40) 
(41) 
---(42) (44) 
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07. Have you experienced this symptom (cluster) before? 
1 --yes 
2 -·no [go to Q. 11] 
08. Using the response scale on page 3 of your handout, select the letter that 
indicates about how often you experience this symptom (cluster). 
A B C D E 
2 3 4 5 
(45) 
(46) 
09. Do you think that your recent experience with this symptom (cluster) was similar 
to previous experiences, or was it different in some way? 
1 O. In what way was it different? 
1 -- similar [go to Q. 11] 
2 - different 
11. In general, do you think that (.STATE SVMPTOM (CLUSTEBU is 
caused by one factor •• or can it be caused by more than one factor? 
1 •• multiple factors [go to Q. 17] 
2 •• single factor 
(47) 
(48) (50) 
(51) 
12. What do you think is the sole cause of (.STATE syMpTOM <CLUSTEBlJ ? 
CAUSE #1 (SKIP) 
I am now going to give you a form - and would like you rate this cause on a 
number of different scales. Please read all the directions carefully •• and take as 
much time as you need. Don't hesitate to ask me any questions. 
213 
13. When you first experienced your symptom (duster) did you think that cause #1 
was the cause if it? 
1 •• yes [go to 0. 23] 
2 ·-no 
14. Since you feel that [STATE SYMPTOM <CLUSTEB)J is caused only by 
(52) 
cause #1, why do you think that it did not come to mind when you first began to 
experience the symptom? 
(53) (55) 
15. Did cause #1 come to mind at a later time? 
1 -yes (56) 
2 •• no f.STOP .. ENO THE INTERVIEW] 
16. About how long after you began to experience your symptom (cluster) did you 
think that cause #1 was the cause? • 
(57)(58) 
• [go to Q. 23] 
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17. I'd like you to take a few minutes and think about the causes of [STATE 
SYMPTOM <CLUSTER}]. Tell me out loud what you think the causes are .. 
and I'll write them down as you say them. Please say anything that comes to 
your mind. 
(number causes In the order given by respondent) 
[prorr.,t Anything else?] 
(59)(60) 
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'I 
18. When you first experienced your symptom (duster) did you think about what was 
causing it? 
1 •• yes [go to a. 22] 
2 ··no 
19. Since you feel that (§TATE SYMPTOM CCLUSTEB>J can be caused by 
a number of factors, why do you think that none of these factors came to mind 
when you first began to experience your symptom (cluster)? 
(61) 
(62) (64) 
20. Did you think about a cause at a later time? 
(65) 
1 ··yes 
2 -· no [STOP - END THE INTERVIEW) 
21. About how long after you began to experience your symptom (duster) did you 
think about what was causing it? 
(66) (67) 
22. What was the very first cause that you thought about? 
(68)(69) 
23. Were there any qualities of the symptom (cluster) such as its location, its level of 
discomfort, its duration or its behavior that lad you to think that cause #1 was the 
cause? 
1 --yes (70) 
2 •• no [go to a. 25] 
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24. What was or were the aspects of the symptom (cluster) that made you think 
about cause #1? 
3-( 1)- -(4) 
25. When you thought that cause #1 might be the cause of your symptom (cluster), 
did you do anything to help relieve the symptom (cluster)? 
1 -- yes 
2 •• no [go to Q. 30] 
26. Please tell me what kinds of things you did to help relieve your symptom when 
you thought that cause #1 was the cause. If you did multiple things, try to 
remember the order in which you did them. 
( 5) 
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27. Sometimes the things we do to relieve our symptoms work, other times they do 
not. Would you say that the result of your action(s) to relieve your symptom 
(cluster) tended to make you doubt that cause #1 was the cause -· would you 
say that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact that 
cause #1 was the cause -- or would you say that the result of your action(s) 
didn't affect your thinking in either way? 
1 •• doubt cause 
2 -- support cause [go to Q. 29] 
3 -- no effect [go to Q. 31] 
(12) 
28. Why do you think that the result of your action(s) tended to make you doubt that 
cause #1 was the cause of your symptom (duster)? • 
(13) (15) 
• [go to Q. 31] 
29. Why do you think that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact 
that cause #1 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)?• 
(16) (18) 
• [go to Q. 31] 
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30. Why didn't you try to relieve your symptom (cluster) in some way? 
(19)- (21) 
31. There are times when we experience a symptom and think that we are sick --
there are other times when we have a symptom and do not think that we are 
sick. When you thought that your symptom (cluster) might be caused by 
cause #1, did you think of yourself as being sick? 
1 --yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 33] 
32. What was it that made you think that you were sick? * 
(22) 
(23) (25) 
• [go to a. 34) 
33. Why Is it that you did not see yourself as being sick? 
(26) (28) 
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34. Did you talk with any nonmedical person -- such as a friend or relative -- about 
your symptom (duster) when you thought that cause #1 was the cause? 
1 --yes 
2 -- no (go to Q. 48] 
35. How many nonmedical people did you talk with at this time? 
(30)(31) 
Using the list on page 4 of your handout, please identify the person or persons 
who you spoke with. Just call off the letter or letters that apply to you. 
A B C 0 E F G H 1• 
Frequency __ -- __ -- -
(32)(33)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40) 
·Pf I ask: Who was that? ___________ _ 
pt respondent lden1lfl88 more 1han one person, then read) 
I know that you spoke with more than one person, but for our discussion today I 
would like to talk with you only about the first person you talked with. 
36. Did you talk with this person with the intention of discussing your symptom 
(cluster)? 
1 -·yes 
2 ··no 
37. During your conversation, did this person tell you what he or she thought might 
be causing your symptom (duster)? 
1 -- yes 
2--no (gotoQ41] 
(41) 
(42) 
220 
38. Did he or she think that your symptom was caused by cause #1? 
1 -- yes (43) 
2 -- no fgo to a 45] 
39. Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause 11 was the cause of 
your symptom (duster)? 
40. Why not? • 
• f9o to a. 48) 
1 -- yes fgo to a. 48) 
2 -- no 
(44) 
(45) (47) 
41. Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you think more 
strongly that cauH 11 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? 
1 -- yes (48) 
2 -- no fgo to a. 43) 
42. What did he or she say? • 
(49) (51) 
• f9o to a. 48] 
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43. Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you start to 
doubt that cause #1 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? 
1 -- yes 
2 •• no [go to Q. 48] 
44. What did he or she say? • 
(52) 
(53) (55) 
• [go to Q. 48) 
45. What did this person think was causing your symptom (cluster)? 
(56) (58) 
46. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause #1 was the cause of your symptom 
(cluster)? 
47. Why not? 
1 •• yes [go to Q. 48] 
2 ··no 
(59) 
(60) (62) 
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48. Did you visit a doctor or nurse to discuss your symptom (cluster) when you 
thought that cause #1 was the cause? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 57] 
49. [read @lllli!w If a. 34 Is yes) 
Did you visit a medical person before -- or after you spoke with a friend 
regarding your symptom (cluster)? 
1 -- before 
2 -- after 
50. Why did you decide to go to a health professional? 
(63) 
(64) 
(65) (67) 
51. Did the doctor or nurse think that your symptom (cluster) was caused by 
cause..,? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 54) 
3 -- don't know [go to a. 57] 
52. Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause .., was the cause of 
your symptom (cluster)? 
53. Why not? • 
1 -- yes [go to a. 57] 
2 -- no 
(68) 
(69) 
(70) (72) 
• [go to a. 57) 
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54. What did the doctor or nurse think was causing your symptom (cluster)? 
4-( 1) ( 4) 
55. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause #1 was the cause of your symptom 
(cluster)? 
56. Why not? • 
1 -- yes (go to a. 57] 
2 -- no 
( 5) 
( 6) ( 8) 
57. When you thought that cauae #1 was causing your symptom, did you refer to 
any type of medical guide to do some reading on the subject? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 62) 
58. Did you find any information that tended to make you feel more strongly that 
cause #1 was the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 60) 
59. What did you read? 
( 9) 
(10) 
(11) (13) 
• (go to a. 62J 
224 
60. Did you find any information that tended to make you doubt that cause #1 was 
the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 62] 
61. What did you read? 
62. Overall, what would you say it was that gave you the due to think that 
cause #1 might be the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- [if answered] [go to Q. 63) 
2 -- [if !W answered} [go to Q. 64) 
63. What was it? 
(14) 
(15) (17) 
(18) 
(19) (21) 
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64. Was there anything that gave you the impression to think that perhaps 
cause #1might not be the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to Q. 66) 
65. What was it? 
(22) 
(23) (25) 
66. After you thought about cauae #1, did you think about any other cause that 
might account for your symptom (cluster)? 
1 -- yes (go to Q. 68) 
2 -- no• 
• Pf respondent bellews In only alngle cause go to a. 159, else go to 
a. 67J 
67. You said earlier that STATE SYMPTOM (CLUSTER> can be caused by 
(26) 
more than one factor, yet when you experienced your symptom (cluster) you only 
considered cause #1. Why do you think that other causes didn't come to mind? 
(27) (29) 
·(go to a. 159] 
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68. What was the second cause that you thought of - that is, what was the cause that 
you thought of after you thought of cause #1? 
(30)(31) 
69. Were there any qualities of the symptom (cluster) such as its location, its level of 
discomfort, its duration, or its behavior that led you to think that cause #2 was 
the cause? 
1 ··yes 
2 •• no fgo to a. 71) 
70. What was or were the aspects of the symptom (duster) that made you think 
about cause #2? 
(32) 
(33) (35) 
71. When you thought that cause '2 might be the cause of your symptom (duster), 
did you do anything to help relieve the symptom (cluster)? 
1 -yes (36) 
2 •• no fgo to a. 76) 
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72. Please tell me what kinds of things you did to help relieve your symptom when 
you thought that cause #2 was the cause. If you did multiple things, try to 
remember the order in which you did them. 
[prol11't Did you think that was helpful?] 
.........•••.••••... yes no dk 
(37) 
•.•......•.•.•.....• yes no dk 
(38) 
.....•.........•.... yes no dk 
(39) 
•....•.•.•....••.•.. yes no dk 
(40) 
...••..•...•••...••• yes no dk 
(41) 
.•.•....•.•.....•.•. yes no dk 
(42) 
73. Sometimes the things we do to relieve our symptoms work, other times they do 
not. Would you say that the result of your action(s) to relieve your symptom 
(cluster) tended to made you doubt that cauM 12 was the cause ·- would you 
say that the result of your actlon(s) tended to support the fact that 
cauM #2 was the cause •• or would you say that the result of your action(s) 
didn't affect your thinking in either way? 
1 -- doubt cause 
2 ·- support cause (go tlO Q. 75] 
3 •• no effect (go tD Q. 77] 
74. Why do you say that the result of your action(s) tended to make you doubt that 
cause 12 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? • 
(43) 
(44) (45) 
• (go tlO Q. 77] 
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75. Why do you say that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact that 
caua. #2 was the ca.use of your symptom (duster)?• 
(47) (49) 
• [go to Q. 77) 
76. Why didn't you try to relieve your symptom (cluster) In some way? 
(50) (52) 
77. There are times when we experience a symptom and think that we are sick·· 
there are other times when we have a symptom and do not think that we are 
sick. When you thought that your symptom (cluster) was ca.used by caua. '2, 
did you think of yourself as being sick? 
1 ··yes 
2 •• no (go to Q. 79) 
(53) 
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78. What was it that made you think that you were sick? • 
(54) (56) 
• [go to a. soi 
79. Why is it that you did not see yourself as being sick? 
(57) (59) 
80. Did you talk with any nonmedlcal person -- such as a friend or relative -- about 
your symptom (cluster) when you thought that cauae ~was the cause? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no (go to a. 94] 
81. How many nonmedical people did you talk with at this time? 
(60) 
(61 )(62) 
Using the list on page 4 of your handout, please identify the person or persons 
who you spoke with. Just call off the letter or letters that apply to you. 
A B c· D. E F G H 1* 
Fl8qU8flC)' - - - - - - - - -(63)(64)(65)(66)(67)(68)(69)(70)(71) 
*Pf I ask: Who was that? ___________ _ 
[If respondent ldentlftee more than one person, then read] 
I know that you spoke with more than one person, but for our discussion today I 
would like to talk with you only about the first person you talked with. 
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82. Did you talk with this person with the Intention of discussing your symptom 
(cluster)? 
1 ··yes 
2 ··no 5·( 1) ( 2) 
83. During your conversation, did this person tell you what he or she thought might 
be causing your symptom (cluster)? 
1 -·yes 
2 -- no [go to a 87) 
84. Did he or she think that your symptom was caused by cause #2? 
1 ··yes 
2 -- no [go to a 91) 
85. Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause #2 was the cause of 
your symptom (cluster)? 
86. Why not? • 
1 •• yes [go to a. 94) 
2 -- no 
( 3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
( 6) ( 8) 
• [go to a. 94J 
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87. Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you think more 
strongly that cau .. '2 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? 
1 ··yes ( 9) 
2 •• no [go to Q. 89J 
88. What did he or she say? • 
(10) (12) 
• [go to Q. 94] 
89. Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you start to 
doubt that cause 1112 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? 
1 ··yes (13) 
2 ··no (goto Q. 94] 
90. What did he or she say? • 
(14) (16) 
• [go to Q. 94] 
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91. What did this person think was causing your symptom (cluster)? 
(17) (19) 
92. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause #2 was the cause of your symptom 
(cluster)? 
93. Whynot? 
1 •• yes (go to a. 94] 
2 ··no 
(20) 
(21) (23) 
94. Did you visit a doctor or nurse to disruss your symptom (cluster) when you 
thought that cauM 12 was the cause? 
1 ··yes 
2 •• no [go to Q. 103] 
95. (read ciroDw If Q. 80 Is y•) 
Old you visit a medical person before •• or after you spoke with a friend 
regarding your symptom (cluster)? 
1 .. before 
2- after 
96. Why did you decide to go to a health professional? 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) (28) 
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97. Did the doctor or nurse think that your symptom (cluster) was caused by 
cause#2? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 100) 
3 -- don't know [go to a. 103) 
98. Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause #2 was the cause of 
your symptom (duster)? 
99. Why not? * 
1 -- yes [go to a. 103) 
2 -- no 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) (33) 
·[go to a. 103) 
100. What did the doctor or nurse think was causing your symptom (cluster)? 
(34) (36) 
1 01. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause 12 was the cause of your symptom 
(cluster)? 
1 02. Why not? 
1 -- yes [go to a. 103) 
2 -- no 
(37) 
(38) (40) 
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1 03. When you thought that cause #2 was causing your symptom, did you refer to 
any type of medical guide to do some reading on the subject? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 108] 
1 04. Did you find any information that tended to make you feel more strongly that 
cause #2 was the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 106] 
1 05. What did you read? 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) (45) 
·[go to a. 108] 
106. Did you find any information that tended to make you doubt that cause #2 was 
the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to a. 108] 
107. What did you read? 
(46) 
(47) (49) 
108. Overall, what would you say it was that gave you the clue to think that 
cause #2 might be the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- [it answered) [go to a. 109] (50) 
2 -- [if aiiL.answered) (go to a. 110] 
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1 09. What was it? 
11 o. Was there anything that gave you the impression to think that perhaps 
cause #2 might not be the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- yes 
2 -- no [go to Q, 112] 
111 . What was it? 
(51) (53) 
(54) 
(55) (57) 
112. After you thought about cause #2, did you think about any other cause that 
might account for your symptom (duster)? 
1 -- yes (58) 
2 -- no [go to Q. 159] 
113. What was the third cause that you thought of-- that is, what was the cause that 
you thought of after you thought of cause #2? 
(59)(60) 
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114. Were there any qualities of the symptom (cluster) such as its location, its level of 
discomfort, its duration, or its behavior that led you to think that cauae #3 was 
the cause? 
1 ··yes 
2 ··no [go to Q. 116] 
115. What was or were the aspects of the symptom (duster) that made you think 
about cauae #3? 
(61) 
(62) (64) 
116. When you thought that cauae #3 might be the cause of your symptom (duster), 
did you do anything to help relieve the symptom (cluster)? 
1 ··yes (65) 
2 •• no [go to a. 121) 
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117. Please tell me what kinds of things you did to help relieve your symptom when 
you thought that cau• #3 was the cause. If you did multiple things, try to 
remember the order in which you did them. 
(prompt Did you think that was helpful?] 
••....•.••••....•... yes no dk 
&-( 1)( 2) 
••.•.•••••.•...•..•• yes no dk 
•.•...•••...••••.••• yes no dk 
.•••.•.•••..••••.•.• yes no dk 
•••••.••••••.••••••. yes no dk 
••.••.•••••••••••••• yes no dk 
118. Sometimes the things we do to relieve our symptoms work, other times they do 
not. Would you say that the result of your actlon(s) to relieve your symptom 
(cluster) tended to made you doubt that came #3 was the cause •• would you 
say that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact that 
cause #3 was the cause ··or would you say that the result of your action(s) 
didn't affect your thinking in either way? 
1 •• doubt cause 
2 •• support cause (go to Q. 120] 
3 ··no effect (go to Q. 122) 
119. Why do you say that the result of your action(s) tended to make you doubt that 
cause #3 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? • 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
( 6) 
( 7) 
( 8) 
(Q)-(11) 
·(go to a. 1221 
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120. Why do you say that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact that 
cause #3 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? • 
(12) (14) 
• [go m a. 1221 
121 . Why didn't you try to relieve your symptom (cluster) in some way? 
(15) (17) 
122. There are times when we experience a symptom and think that we are sick --
there are other times when we have a symptom and do not think that we are 
sick. When you thought that your symptom (cluster) was caused by cause #3, 
did you think of yourself as being sick? 
1 -yes 
2 •• no [go 1D a. 124] 
(18) 
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123. What was it that made you think that you were sick? • 
(19) (21) 
• [go to Q. 125) 
124. Why is it that you did not see yourself as being sick? 
(22) (24) 
125. Did you talk with any nonmedical person - such as a friend or relative -- about 
your symptom (duster) when you thought that cauu '3 was the cause? 
1 --yes 
2 ··no [go to Q. 139) 
126. How many nonmedical people did you talk with at this time? 
(25) 
(26)(27) 
Using the list on page 4 of your handout, please identify the person or persons 
who you spoke with. Just call off the letter or letters that apply to you. 
A B C D E F G H I* 
Frequency - - - - - - - - -(28)(29) (30)(31 )(32)(33)(34)(35)(36) 
•[If I ask: Who was that? ____ ---- ___ _ 
Pf reapondent Identifies more 1han OM person, then rNd) 
I know that you spoke with more than one person, but for our discussion today I 
would like to talk with you only about the first person you talked with. 
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127. Did you talk with this person with the intension of discussing your symptom 
(cluster)? 
1 -- yes 
2-- no 
128. During your conversation, did this person tell you what he or she thought might 
be causing your symptom (cluster)? 
1 --yes 
2 -- no [go to Q 132] 
129. Did he or she think that your symptom was caused by cause 113? 
1 --yes 
2 -- no [go to Q 136] 
130. Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause 113 was the cause of 
your symptom (cluster)? 
131. Why not?• 
1 -·yes [gO to Q. 139] 
2 --no 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) (43) 
• [go to Q. 139] 
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132. Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you think more 
strongly that cause t3 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? 
1 ·-yes (44) 
2 -- no [go to Q. 134) 
133. What did he or she say? • 
{45) (47) 
• [go to Q. 139) 
134. Was there anything that this person said that In some way made you start to 
doubt that cause t3 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? 
1 --yes (48) 
2 -- no [go to a. 139) 
135. What did he or she say?• 
(49) (51) 
• [go to Q. 139) 
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136. What did this person think was causing your symptom (cluster)? 
(52) (54) 
137. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause 413 was the cause of your symptom 
(cluster)? 
138. Why not? 
1 -- yes [go to a. 130] 
2 -- no 
(55) 
(56)- (58) 
139. Did you visit a doctor or nurse to discuss your symptom (cluster) when you 
thought that cause '3 was the cause? 
1 --yes 
2 -- no [go to Q. 148] 
140. [read clllliJW If Q. 125 la y.s] 
Did you visit a medical person before -- or after you spoke with a friend 
regarding your symptom (cluster)? 
1 -- before 
2- after 
141. Why did you decide to go to a health professional? 
(59) 
(60) 
(61) (63) 
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142. Did the doctor or nurse think that your symptom (cluster) was caused by 
cause#3? 
1 -- yes 7-( 1)( 2) 
2 -- no [go to a. 145) 
3 -- don't know [go to a. 148) 
143. Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause #3 was the cause of 
your symptom (cluster)? 
144. Why not? • 
1 -- yes [go to a. 148) 
2 -- no 
( 3) 
( 4) ( 6) 
• [go to a. 148) 
145. What did the doctor or nurse think was causing your symptom (cluster)? 
( 7) ( 9) 
146. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause #3 was the cause of your symptom 
(cluster)? 
147. Why not?• 
1 -- yes [go to Q. 148) 
2 -- no 
(10) 
(11) (13) 
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148. When you thought that cauae 13 was causing your symptom, did you refer to 
any type ot medical guide to do some reading on the subject? 
1 ··yes 
2 -- no [go ta Q. 153] 
149. Did you find any Information that tended to make you feel more strongly that 
cause 13 was the cause of your symptom? 
1 •• yes 
2 -- no fgo ta a. 151] 
150. What did you read? 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) (18) 
• [go ta a. 153] 
151. Did you find any information that tended to make you doubt that cauee 13 was 
the cause of your symptom? 
1 --yes 
2 •• no (9o ta Q. 153] 
152. What did you read? 
(19) 
(20) (22) 
153. Overall, what would you say it was that gave you the due to think that 
cause 13 might be the cause of your symptom? 
1 -- {if inswered} [go ta a. 154] (23) 
2 -- {if am answered} [go tD a. 155] 
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154. What was it? 
155. Was there anything that gave you the impression to think that perhaps 
cause #3 might not be the cause of your symptom? 
1 --yes 
2 -- no (go to Q. 157) 
156. What was it? 
(24) (26) 
(27) 
(28) (30) 
157. After you thought about cause #3, did you think about any other cause that 
might account for your symptom (cluster)? 
1 -yes (31) 
2 -- no [go to Q. 159] 
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158. Please tell me what the cause or causes were. If you thought about more than 
one more cause, try to remember the order in which you thought about them. 
[pron1)t anything else?) 
CAUSE #4 
(32)(33) 
CAUSE #5 
(34)(35) 
CAUSE#6 
(36)(37) 
CAUSE#7 
(38)(39) 
CAUSE#B 
(40)(41) 
CAUSE #9 
(42)(43) 
CAUSE #10 
(44)(45) 
159. I assume, then, that cause #laat was the last cause that you considered. Is that 
right? 
1 ··yes [go to Q. 161] 
2 ··no 
160. What was the last cause that you thought about? 
(46) 
161. This concludes our discussion regarding your symptom (cluster). Would you like 
me to go back and change or modify any of your answers? 
1 ·• yes [modify answers ihen STOP] 
2 ··no [STOP] 
(47) 
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APPENDIX C 
very little 
discomfort 
a lot of 
discomfort 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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not very very 
serious serious 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
A 
have never or 
almost never 
experienced 
the symptom 
B 
less than 
3or4 
times per 
year 
C D 
every every week 
month or so 
or so 
E 
more than 
once every 
week 
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A-coworker 
B - friend 
C-parent 
D - brother I sister 
E -- other relative 
F-- roommate 
G- clergy 
H-spouse 
I - other (please specify) 
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APPENDIX D 
HEAL TH OPINION SURVEY 
The questions on the next two pages ask for your opinions about different kinds of 
health care. For each statement, decide whether you .agr.u. or disagree and cirde the 
answer which l2ast. fits your opinion. Each person Is different, so there are no "right" or 
"wrong" answers. Please circle an answer for each question. Do not leave any 
blank. Even if you find that you don't completely agree or disagree with a statement, 
choose the 20§. answer that comes~ to what you believe. 
If you have any questions, please ask the study coordinator. 
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For each question, circle 
the one answer that comes 
~IQIHl tg wbat ~QU b~li~ll!i 
1. I usually don't ask the doctor or nurse many questions 
about what they're doing during a medical exam. Agree Disagree _12-{ 1) 
2. Except for serious illness, irs generally better to take 
care of your .Qlf.D. health than to seek professional help. Agree Disagree _(2) 
3. I'd rather have doctors and nurses make the decisions 
about what's best than for them to give me a whole lot 
of choices. Agree Disagree _(3) 
4. Instead of waiting for them to tell me, I usually ask the 
doctor or nurse immediately after an exam about my 
health. Agree Disagree _(4) 
5. It is better to rely on the judgements of doctors (who 
are experts) then to rely on "common sense" in taking 
care or your own body. Agree Disagree _(5) 
6. Clinics and hospitals are good places to go for help 
since it§ !2g!il fgc mildi"5&1 g;isgga§ 112 la~g cg§QQCJ§i-
bililJ'. for health-care. Agree Disagree _(6) 
7. Leaming how to cure some of your illness without 
contacting a physician is a good idea Agree Disagree _(7) 
8. I usually ask the doctor or nurse lots of questions 
about the procedures during a medical exam. Agree Disagree _(8) 
9. It's almost always better to seek professional help 
than to try to treat yourself. Agree Disagree _(9) 
1 0. It's better to trust the doctor or nurse in charge of a 
medical procedure than to question what they are 
doing. Agree Disagree _(10) 
11 . Leaming how to cure some of your illness without 
contacting a physician may create more harm than 
good. Agree DilagrM _(11) 
12. Recovery is usually quicker under the care of a 
doctor or nurse than when patients take care of 
tbgm§glves. Agree Disagree _(12) 
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13. If it costs the same, I'd rather have a doctor or nurse 
give me treatments than to do the same treatments 
myself. Agl'll8 Disagree _(13) 
14. It is better to rely less on physicians and more on 
your own common sense when it comes to caring 
for your body. Pgee Disagree _(14) 
15. I usually wait for the doctor or nurse to tell me about 
the results of a medical exam rather than asking them 
immediately. Ag/ea Oillagnle (15) 
16. I'd rather be given many choices about what's best 
for my health than to have the doctor make the decisions 
for me. Ag/ea Oillagnle _(16) 
APPENDIX E 
SYMPTOM CHECKLIST 
On the following pages, several common symptoms or bodily sensations are listed. 
Most people have experienced most of these feelings at one time or another. We are 
currently interested in discovering how prevalent each symptom is among college 
students. All information will be considered confidential. 
DIRECTIONS 
Please read each of the symptoms on the next few pages and circle the letter which 
indicates how frequently you experience that symptom. Use the following scale for 
each symptom. 
A B c D E 
Have never or Less than Every Every week More than 
almost never 3or4 month or so once every 
experienced times per or so week 
the symptom year 
For example, if your eyes tend to water once every week or two, you would circle letter 
D. 
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers to this task. Please respond to each symptom 
in terms of your own experience. If you have any questions, please ask the study 
coordinator. 
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A B c D E 
Have never or Less than Every Every week More than 
almost never 3or4 month or so once every 
experienced times per or so week 
the symptom year 
1 . Eyes water A B c D E - 111-( 1) 
2. Itching or painful eyes A B c D E ( 2) 
3. Ringing in ears A B c D E ( 3) 
4. Temporary deafness or hard of hearing A B c D E ( 4) 
5. lump in throat A B c D E ( S) 
6. Choking sensations A B c D E ( 6) 
7. Sneezing spells A B c D E ( 7) 
8. Running nose A B c D E ( 8) 
9. Congested nose A B c D E ( 9) 
10. Bleeding nose A B c D E (10) 
11. Asthma or wheezing A B c D E (11) 
1 2. Coughing A B c D E (12) 
13. Out of breath A B c D E (13) 
14. Swollen ankles A B c D E (14) 
15. Chest Pains A B c D E (15) 
16. Racing heart A B c D E (16) 
17. Cold hands and feet, even in hot weather A B c D E (17) 
18. Leg Cramps A B c D E (18) 
19. Insomnia A B c D E (19) 
20. Toothaches A B c D E (20) 
21. Upset stomach A B c D E (21) 
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A B c D E 
Have never or Less than Every Every week More than 
almost never 3 or4 month or so once every 
experienced times per or so week 
the symptom year 
22. Indigestion A B c D E (22) 
23. Heartburn A B c D E (23) 
24. Severe pains or cramps In stomach A B c D E (24) 
25. Diarrhea A B c D E (25) 
26. Constipation A B c D E (26) 
27. Hemorrhoids A B c D E (27) 
28. Swollen joints A B c D E (28) 
29. Stiff muscles A B c D E (29) 
30. Back pains A B c D E (30) 
31. Sensitive or tender skin A 8 c D E (31) 
32. Face flushes A 8 c D E (32) 
33. Severe itching A B c D E (33) 
34. Skin breaks out in a rash A B c D E (34) 
35. Acne or pimples on face A B c D E (35) 
36. Acne or pimples other than face A B c D E (36) 
37. Boils A B c D E (37) 
38. Sweat, even in cold weather A 8 c D E (38) 
39. Strong reactions to insect bites A B c D E (39) 
40. Headaches A 8 c D E (40) 
41. Sensation of pressure in head A 8 c D E (41) 
42. Hot flashes A 8 c D E (42) 
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A B c D E 
Have never or Less than Every Every week More than 
almost never 3or4 month or so once every 
experienced times per or so week 
the symptom year 
43. Chills A B c D E (43) 
44. Dizziness A B c D E (44) 
45. Feel faint A B c D E (45) 
46. Numbness or tingling in any part of body A B c D E (46) 
47. Twitching of eyelid A B c D E (47) 
48. Twitching other than eyelid A B c D E (48) 
49. Hands tremble or shake A B c D E (49) 
50. Stiff joints A B c D E (50) 
51. Sore muscles A B c D E (51) 
52. Sore throat A B c D E (52) 
53. Sunburn A B c D E (53) 
54. Nausea A B c D E (54) 
APPENDIX F 
BODY PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
The statements on the next page are about the perceptions of one's body. Please rate 
each of these statements in terms of how characteristic thay are of your own 
perceptions. Each statement should be rated on the scale that goes from O (extremely 
uncharacteristic of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic of me). There are no right or 
wrong answers to this questionnaire so please make your ratings in accord with your 
own personal perceptions. Be sure to rate all 15 statements. 
If you have any questions, please ask the study coordinator. 
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extreme¥ elllremefy 
unchanlctel'i!lic cl1aracteristic 
olme olme 
1. I am sensitive to lntemal bodily tensions. 0 2 3 4 11-(1) 
2. I think a lot about my body build. 0 2 3 4 (2) 
3. I am concerned about my posture. 0 2 3 4 (3) 
4. I like to make sure that my hair looks right. 0 2 3 4 (4) 
5. I know immediately when my mouth or 
throat gets dry. 0 2 3 4 (5) 
6. I'm beter coordinated than most people. 0 2 3 4 (6) 
7. I'm very aware of changes in my body 
temperature. 0 2 3 4 (7) 
8. I can often feel my heart beating. 0 2 3 4 (8) 
9. For my size, I'm pretty strong. 0 2 3 4 ('9) 
10. lrs important for me that my skin looks 
nice ••• for example, has no blemishes. 0 2 3 4 (10) 
11. I am quick to sense the hunger 
contractions in my stomach. 0 2 3 4 (11) 
12. I'm capable of moving quickly. 0 2 3 4 (12) 
13. When with others, I want my hands to be 
clean and look nice. 0 2 3 4 (13) 
14. I'm light on my feet compared to most 
people. 0 2 3 4 (14) 
15. I'm very aware of my best and worst 
facial features. 0 2 3 4 (15) 
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